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Abstract
This thesis studies how  scal and environmental policies a ect  rms’ behavior and
economic performance. In chapter 1, co-authored with Stefan Lamp, we focus on the
e ect of tax adjustment on  rms’ investment decisions. Using a detailed narrative of
tax changes in Germany covering 40 years of  scal adjustments, we de ne and exploit
the exogenous variation of tax bills to quantify the e ect of tax changes on future in-
vestment plans of  rms as well as on realized investment. In chapter 2, co-authored
with Hélia Costa, we study how uncertainty over environmental policy a ects  rms’
investment in low-carbon technologies. We model policy uncertainty in the context
of an emission trading scheme and we develop a three period sequential model. The
set-up of the model combines the industry and electricity sectors and encompasses both
irreversible and reversible investment possibilities for  rms. Finally, in chapter 3, I
investigate whether international and domestic  rms’ productivity growth may be het-
erogeneously a ected by environmental policy. Using a novel measure of environmen-
tal policy stringency and a panel of 11 OECD countries and 22 manufacturing sectors
over the period 2000-2009, I estimate the di erence in multi-factor productivity growth
between multinational and domestic  rms associated with a tightening of domestic en-
vironmental policy.
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Preface
In recent years, most of the OECD countries have experience  scal consolidation and en-
vironmental policy tightening. Fiscal and environmental policy tightening is necessary
for addressing  scal and environmental sustainability, respectively. Yet these measures
may have relevant implications for productivity and growth. This thesis contributes
uncovering these e ects by investigating how a policy change as well the design of the
policy itself (i.e. the choice of the policy instruments and the predictability of the policy
rule) in uence  rms’ propensity to invest and  rms’ productivity. The micro perspec-
tive followed throughout this thesis allows to better understand the dynamics of  rms’
investment and productivity, which would ultimately a ect aggregate growth.
The  rst chapter is a joint work with Stefan Lamp1 and investigates the relationship
between  scal consolidation, business plans and  rm investment. Based on a detailed
narrative of tax changes in Germany covering 40 years of  scal adjustments, we de ne
and exploit the exogenous variation of tax bills to quantify the e ect of tax changes on
 rms’ realized and planned investment, considering the IFO investment survey dataset.2
We  nd that recently published laws and laws under current discussion in the media and
in the parliament shape future investment plans. Taking into account the forward look-
ing behavior and adjusting the announcement dates according, we  nd that an increase
in tax equal to 1% of the value added of the total manufacturing industry leads to a
lagged decrease in planned investment of about 4%. For realized investment growth we
estimate an average e ect of 8%. Not taking into account this anticipation e ect would
lead to strongly biased estimates. Furthermore, by using micro-level  rm data, we are
able to elaborate further on heterogeneity in terms of  rm size, industry sub sector as
well as by type of tax shock. Di erently from previous literature, we  nd that con-
sumption taxes and income tax adjustments are most harmful for growth as they have
the strongest negative and persistent e ect on investment growth at  rm level. The
 nding thus support recent hypotheses that highlight the importance of the demand
channel in the transmission of  scal policies, and may act through future demand ex-
pectation.
1Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University
2EBDC Business Investment Panel
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The second chapter, joint with Hélia Costa3, studies how uncertainty over future pol-
icy a ects  rms’ investment in low-carbon technologies. In the context of a carbon
dioxide Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), we develop a three period sequential model
which includes a welfare-maximizing regulator and the two sectors regulated by the
European scheme (EU ETS): manufacturing and utilities. Contrary to previous contri-
bution, we allow  rms to have two pollution-abatement possibilities: irreversible and
reversible investment. Additionally, we explicitly model policy uncertainty as the rela-
tive weight that the regulator assigns to economic activity with respect to environment
concerns when maximizing the welfare function. We assume that the realization of
this preference parameter in unknown by  rms and it follows a mean preserving spread
process and we calibrate the model using United Kingdom data. In line with previous re-
search, we  nd the uncertainty always reduces investment in irreversible technologies.
However, uncertainty increases investment in reversible technology because it provides
 rms with an additional instrument to cope with future policy uncertainty:  rms can
re-optimize and decide which type of technology to employ in the production process
after the uncertainty is realized. Finally, the interplay of the two types of investment
possibilities (reversible and irreversible) a ects the aggregate level of investment in low
carbon technology: the negative e ect of uncertainty on irreversible investment carries
over to the pro tability of the reversible one, so that for higher levels of uncertainty
aggregate investment decreases.
The third chapter looks at another aspect of environmental policy and investigates
whether a tightening in domestic environmental policy stringency (EPS) may a ect
 rms’ economic performance heterogeneously according to their degree of interna-
tionalization. Multinationals (MNEs) may be better suited to adjust to an increase in
EPS through two main channels: o -shoring part of their production to a liates in
countries with lax environmental policy, exploiting intra-group technology transfers
and scaling-up investments in energy-e ciency. MNEs may consequently experience
higher productivity growth than domestic  rms that are, instead, not able to exploit
such international channels when facing an EPS tightening. Using a panel of 11 OECD
countries and 22 sectors over the period 2000-2009, I estimate a Neo-Schumpeterian
model of multi-factor productivity. Productivity growth depends on the  rm’s ability
3Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, LSE
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to adopt innovative and e cient technologies available in the market (technological
catch-up) and on  rms’ ability to innovate (technological pass-through) (Acemoglu et
al., 2006; Aghion and Howitt, 2006). Environmental policy stringency is proxied us-
ing a novel OECD cross-country and cross-time indicator and, in the mode, the EPS is
allowed to a ect  rms depending on their technological advancement, the industry en-
vironmental dependence and their degree of internationalization. The estimated e ect
of a change in EPS for the most productive multinational  rms is 60% higher than for
domestic  rms. This positive e ect is con rmed using two alternative measures to ap-
proximate the degree of integration in the global market at industry level: participation
in global value chains and outsourcing of production of intermediates abroad. Finally,
larger changes in EPS are associated with higher boosts in MNEs productivity growth,
suggesting possible non-linearity of the e ect of EPS on productivity.
v
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Chapter 1
The investment e ect of  scal consolida-
tion.
With Stefan Lamp (Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University)
1.1 Introduction
Fiscal consolidation represents one of the main challenges that policy makers are cur-
rently facing in most OECD countries. Understanding how di erent  scal consolidation
measures (i.e. spending cuts and tax increases) a ect growth is therefore crucial. In a
recent paper, Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2012) show empirically that tax-based  s-
cal adjustments have a statistically signi cant di erent e ect on output compared to
spending-based adjustments. The former ones are not only more costly in terms of
output loss than spending adjustments, but they can be also linked to longer-lived re-
cessions. The macro analysis of Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2012) focuses on a large
set of OECD countries and points out that the strong e ect of tax-based consolidation
on output is driven by shifts in business investment. Understanding further the links
between  scal consolidation, business con dence and  rm investment is even more
crucial in periods of excessive debt and/or de cit, when the economy needs an e ective
growth policy agenda. Therefore, our analysis focuses on tax adjustments and tries to
shed light in the interconnection between tax adjustments, business con dence and in-
vestment. Previous studies have been unable to capture the causal link between these
elements either due to the aggregate nature of the data, which does not allow matching
 rm expectations with their investment behavior, or due to the endogeneity of the  s-
cal policy, as one of the key issues in estimating the impact of economic policy is the
identi cation of exogenous  scal shocks.
To deal with the unavailability of  rm investment expectations, previous literature
focuses mainly on realized investment both at the macro and at  rm level. Alesina and
1
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Perotti (1996), using case studies, stress the "credibility e ect" that a decisive discrete
change in the  scal policy stance may have on interest rates which would crowd in
private investment. Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, and Schiantarelli (1999) associate one
percentage point of GDP increase in labor tax with a decrease of aggregate investment
over GDP by 0.17 on impact and a cumulative e ect of about 0.7 in  ve years. Con rm-
ing these results, Cloyne (2011), Mertens and Ravn (2009), and Hayo and Uhl (2013)
 nd a negative, sizable and statistically signi cant e ect of tax increase on investments
at the aggregate level. At  rm level, previous literature builds heavily on neoclassical
models of investment based on the user cost of capital and the Q-theory1. In the user-
cost framework, higher taxes a ect investment negatively through the increase in user
cost of capital. Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1996) exploit cross-sectional varia-
tion in user cost due to major tax reforms. They  nd signi cant e ects with an implied
long-run elasticity of the capital stock with respect to the user cost between -0.5 and
-1.0 2. Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1998) analyze UK  rm investment behavior using
both the underlying Q-theory and user cost of capital, and their estimated e ect reduces
to -0.25. Finally, micro evidence based on cointegration models ( Caballero, Engel, and
Haltiwanger (1995) among others) estimates an average long-run relationship between
capital-output ratio and the user cost of -0.1, where estimates range between -0.01 and
-2.
Regarding the second limitation, the identi cation of exogenous  scal shocks, the
economic literature distinguishes three main methodologies. The  rst branch of liter-
ature follows the structural vector autoregressive approach (SVAR). In this approach,
exogenous  scal shifts are unobservable and identi cation is achieved using sign re-
strictions derived from economic theory ( Mountford and Uhlig (2009)) or by taking
into account institutional features of tax and transfer systems ( Blanchard and Perotti
(2002)). The VAR approach has led to a wide range of estimates of the spending multi-
plier (see Ramey (2011) for a literature survey). The second group of studies consists
mainly of case studies ( Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Alesina and Ardagna (2010), and
Alesina and Ardagna (2012))  nd that spending based adjustments can have a very small
1See Bond and Van Reenen (2007) for a comprehensive overview of microeconometric models of invest-
ment and employment.
2Additional  rm-level evidence on the user-cost elasticity of the investment rate is given by Schwellnus
and Arnold (2008) and Johansson (2008).
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or no output cost at all. Finally, a more recent method that found increasing attention in
the economic literature is the narrative approach. Identi cation is based on observable
exogenous shifts in  scal stance by considering o cial documents, and hence by de ni-
tion focusing only on  scal adjustments that are motivated by de cit reducing purposes.
As pointed out in Mertens and Ravn (2013), an attractive feature of this approach is that
the narrative record summarizes the relevant features of a potentially very large infor-
mation set.
This paper aims at  lling the above described research gap, investigating further the
set of correlations and causality between tax adjustments and private investment, in
order to provide clear insights on the impact of  scal reforms on  rm incentives, and
therefore on growth. In particular, we contribute to the debate in three ways: Firstly,
by considering micro level data we move one step further in establishing a causal link
between tax-based  scal consolidation, business con dence and investment. Taking
advantage of the information on  rms’ planned investment provided by the IFO invest-
ment survey3, we are not only able to compare our micro-based results with the previous
 ndings from the macro literature, but also to take into consideration forward-looking
behavior of the  rms. Secondly, the detailed structure of the dataset allows us to disen-
tangle the e ect in two di erent dimensions: a heterogeneous e ect depending on  rm
size and on the industry sub-sector. In line with Romer and Romer (2010) and Pesca-
tori, Leigh, Guajardo, and Devries (2011), we employ the narrative approach to identify
exogenous tax adjustments. Based on a detailed narrative created by Uhl (2013) for
Germany, we revise 40 years of documented tax legislation (1970-2009) in order to cre-
ate a dataset of tax adjustments that are not cyclically driven nor dictated by long-term
growth considerations. We further investigate the timeline of tax adjustment not only
considering the publication date, as provided by Uhl (2013), but also looking for the
date when the public discussion of the adjustment started. To do so, based on the Lex-
isNexis database, we collect journalistic documents that discuss each of the tax changes
we considered.
Finally, focusing on one country only, we are not only able to consider a much more
accurate policy dataset, testing the results for di erent shock reference dates (discus-
3EBDC Business Investment Panel, http://www.cesifogroup.de/ifoHome/facts/EBDC.html
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sion date, publication and  rst implementation date) but also to disentangle the e ect
according to the type of tax change (income tax, business and corporate tax, or con-
sumption tax). In fact, as pointed out in Mertens and Ravn (2013) and Cloyne and
Surico (2013), there is little reason to expect that the di erent types of taxes available to
governments all have the same impact on the economy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the series
of exogenous tax shocks as developed by Uhl (2013), and which have been adopted for
the purpose of this paper, as well as the  rm level investment data. Section 1.3 describes
in detail the identi cation and the estimation strategy, while the main results are dis-
cussed in section 1.4. Section 1.5 further elaborates on heterogeneity and section 1.6
performs a series of robustness and sensitivity checks. Finally, section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Tax shocks and  rm investment data
1.2.1 Narrative of German tax changes
The series of tax changes is based on Uhl (2013), who elaborates an extensive record of
tax legislation in Germany4. In order to identify all relevant tax law changes Uhl (2013)
uses in a  rst step a size criteria of the budgetary impact of tax changes. Tax shocks are
thus considered important and are included in the narrative if their budgetary impact
reaches 0.1% of GDP in a given year5. This  rst criterion led to the identi cation of
95 important tax changes that are revised in a detailed fashion in Uhl (2013) and that
are classi ed according to their main motivation in "endogenous" and "exogenous" tax
measures in line with the previous literature (see for example Romer and Romer (2010),
4The analysis in Uhl (2013) is based mainly on the Finanzbericht and Bundes nanzplan of the Federal
Republic of Germany. In order to recover all budgetary details of individual tax laws we revised the
Finanzbericht for the years 1970-2009 and the four-year budget plans (Bundes nanzplan) for the time
period 1990-2009.
5Tax shocks are also included if the measure is (close to but) below the 0.1% GDP threshold but tax
law changes consist of individual well de ned measures. Other narratives, such as Pescatori, Leigh,
Guajardo, and Devries (2011) do not state a precise cuto  rule, however for their full dataset of  scal
adjustments, only 5 out of 173 fall below the 0.1% rule, none for Germany.
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Pescatori, Leigh, Guajardo, and Devries (2011) and Cloyne (2013))6.
Key in the narrative approach is to identify the exact motivation behind each tax
change, as this allows excluding tax policy changes dictated by business cycle  uctu-
ations and changes correlated with the dependent variable through other unobserved
factors. As pointed out in Romer and Romer (2010), simply regressing output growth
on all legislated tax changes will lead to biased estimates, given the fact that some tax
changes might be correlated with the error term. Moreover, this bias might be even
more emphasized in case the researcher does not account for the fact that the policy
makers might adjust their policy measures to the current state of the economy, for
example employing countercyclical policies. Even controlling in the regression frame-
work for known macroeconomic shocks and conditions would not solve the issue of
identi cation, as  rstly it would be impossible to proxy for all information about future
output movement that the policy maker may have had and secondly the response to tax
changes is likely to vary from period to period and may be hence correlated with other
unobserved factors in the error term. Thus it is crucial to identify the exact motivation
behind individual tax changes.
We align our classi cation of the motivation of tax changes with Uhl (2013), however
we revise each of the Uhl tax shocks and regroup them according to "exogenous" and
"endogenous" for our analysis of investment. Uhl (2013) classi ed spending driven tax
changes, countercyclical policies and tax changes due to macroeconomic shocks as "en-
dogenous" measures. On the other hand, "exogenous" measures are those dealing with
budget consolidation and structural considerations. While consolidation measures are
related only to past spending and are exogenous to the current macroeconomic stance,
the category of structural tax changes is more controversial as it includes both mea-
sures that aim at long-term growth, incentivizing investment, as well as tax changes
that have been induced by court-rulings and that are hence unrelated to investment
activity. Therefore, building on the previous narrative-literature, in our reclassi cation
we de ne as "exogenous" only those structural changes that are not cyclically driven
nor motivated by long-term growth considerations and hence aimed at investment. The
6As the previous literature building on the narrative approach we slightly abuse terminology and con-
sider "exogenous" all changes that are not systematically correlated with current or lagged output and
investment.
5
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appendix provides some examples of tax changes and their classi cations7.
Given the fact that we have exact information on the timing of individual tax mea-
sures - the date the  rst draft was introduced to the parliament, the date the tax law
was published and information on the public discussion in the newspapers - we test
for the impact at di erent dates. Di erently from other studies that use this approach,
we consider the budgetary impact at announcement. This choice relieves us from di -
cult considerations regarding revisions that are potentially correlated with investment
and the contingent economic situation8 as well as from potential measurement errors.
Furthermore, to avoid heterogeneous displacement e ects, we focus on exogenous tax
shocks that are announced and implemented within the same period.9 Figure 1.1 de-
picts the full series of important tax changes in Germany announced and implemented
within the same period for both "exogenous" and "endogenous" motivations for the pe-
riod 1970-2009, using half-yearly data frequency. As the graph shows clearly, endoge-
nous tax changes are on average larger and more frequent than the exogenous category.
In total, we count with 19 exogenous shocks and 31 endogenous ones. The correlation
between the two time series is 0.09, and is not statistically signi cant (p-value of 0.53).
Given data availability our main analysis focuses on the period 1970-201010. As ex-
plained in more detail in the following section, we group tax changes in both yearly and
half-yearly periods in line with our  rm level investment data. The original tax shock
series, expressed in billions of Euros (governmental budgetary impact), has been  rst
de ated using the gross  xed capital formation de ator for the manufacturing indus-
try11 and divided by total value added (VA) in the manufacturing industry in 2005, in
order to have the main regression variables at a similar scale, which allows for easier
7For a complete overview of all important tax measures in the Federal Republic of Germany, see Uhl
(2013).
8Examples of factors correlated with investment which could drive the revisions are: resistance from
trade unions, deterioration of the economic situation, etc.
9This is in line with the previous literature. See for example Mertens and Ravn (2011) that exclude tax
changes with implementation lag exceeding one quarter. In the robustness section we also control for
shocks that are announced but that are implemented in subsequent periods.
10Our last  scal shock is observed in 2009, however we include one additional year of  rm investment
data to capture the lagged investment e ect.
11The de ator is based on STAN Industry Rev. 3, 2008 (OECD) Database. Investment and  nancial
variables are de ated in the same way.
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Figure 1.1: Legislated tax changes. Half-yearly frequency
interpretation of the coe cients. The exogenous shock series contains both positive
and negative tax measures ranging from -0.011 to 0.014 with a mean absolute impact of
0.002 and a standard deviation of 0.004.12
In terms of timing, focusing on the subset of exogenous shocks, the average length
from the date the draft of the law is introduced to the parliament and the date of publi-
cation of the same is around  ve months 13. On the other hand the average time between
publication and  rst implementation of the tax measure is two months. However a de-
tailed revision of the shocks brings the fact to light that most of the shocks are induced
by a lengthy public discussion prior to the initiation of the legal process of tax change.
The media and newspapers report these discussions and we refer to the date of the  rst
article mentioning as "discussion date". In order to check for this possibility we look
at the timing of news coverage of tax measures prior to the draft date using the online
database LexisNexis. We  nd that the average time lag between initial discussion of the
tax measure and its publication is one year. The appendix provides an overview (Table
12We use the mean absolute impact rather than the simple mean, given both positive and negative shocks.
Alternatively the mean impact of the 12 positive shocks has been 0.005 (0.004) shocks, and for the
seven negative shocks -0.004 (0.004).
13The exact draft date can only be reconstructed for shocks posterior to 1977.
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1.2) containing discussion, draft and publication date of selected tax shocks14.
1.2.2 Firm investment data
Data on  rm investment is obtained from the IFO investment survey (IVS). As pointed
out in Seiler (2012) the IVS was originally introduced in 1955 and considers the man-
ufacturing sector in Germany, however annual investment data is available only from
the mid 1960s onwards. While the initial questionnaire has been distributed only once
a year, from 1993 onwards the survey has been performed bi-annually, in spring and
autumn of the same year, leading to an even richer data structure15.
The IVS questionnaire focuses mainly on  rm investment activity and includes both
forward and backward looking statements of realized and planned investment. As the
questionnaire includes only a small list of potential control variables, the dataset has
been enriched by the Economic and Business Dataset Center (EBDC) with balance sheet
data obtained from Amadeus and Hoppenstedt16. The merged investment data counts
with a total of 202,368 observations that belong to 5,590  rms. In principle the dataset
is longitudinal however the number of  rm that exit at some point in time the panel is
high, so that there are few  rms reporting the entire sample period. In terms of rep-
resentativeness, in 2009 the IVS sample covered 31% of all employment in the German
manufacturing sector (7% of companies), with better representation of bigger  rms (2%
of employment size class < 50 and 66% of employment class size >1000).17
For the purpose of our analysis, the original dataset has been  rst converted to Eu-
ros, using the  xed Euro-DM exchange rate and then de ated with the OECD de ator
for gross  xed capital formation in the manufacturing industry. Furthermore we drop
IFO sector 210 from the analysis, manufacture of mining products, as it does not  nd a
14Using LexisNexis, we were able to track back news coverage for tax adjustments for the period 1992 to
2010.
15Data previous to 1991 corresponds to West Germany, while data posterior to 1991 includes also  rm
from former Eastern Germany.
16The exact merging procedure is described in Seiler (2012).
17The authors would like to thank Heike Mittelmeier and Christian Seiler from the EBDC for providing
this information regarding the IVS.
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clear correspondence in the ISIC manufacturing classi cation. Converting the dataset
to an annual data structure, and constructing the change in realized investment as log
di erence of investment at time t and investment at time t - 1, we are left with 64,310
observations belonging to 5,186 distinct  rms18 19
Most of the literature dealing with  rm level investment considers as dependent vari-
able the ratio of investment (de ned as the change in capital stock) over capital. Even
though the IFO data provides a direct measure of investment, it does not provide us with
an initial capital stock20. Therefore, as alternative measure we normalize investment by
 rm speci c average asset stock over the sample period, which is available for the subset
of  rms that have been merged with the Amadeus and Hoppenstedt databases. Never-
theless also this procedure reduces the sample coverage considerably. Therefore we use
this speci cation only as robustness check for our  ndings, estimating a dynamic  rm-
level investment model as derived in Bond, Harho , and van Reenen (2005) (see section
1.6).
Our empirical analysis focuses both on realized investment growth and on updates
of planned investment. However updates of planned investment are only available for
the subsample period 1993-2010, in which the IVS has been conducted at a bi-annual
frequency. In each round  rms are asked to provide an estimate for their planned in-
vestment for the same year. In addition, in spring  rms are asked how much they have
been investing in the previous year (realized investment in t - 1) and, in autumn, how
much they are planning to invest next year (t + 1). Therefore the richness of the IFO
investment dataset allows us considering both realized investment changes and updates
18Conditioning our sample on  rms that report in two consecutive periods does not change signi cantly
the size composition: For the full sample (sample in di erences) there are 17.6% (15.6%) in size group
up to 49 employees, 31.9% (31.2%) in size group up to 199 employees, 34.7% (35.8%) in the size group
up to 999 employees and 15.8% (17.3%) in the category >1000.
19We allow for zero growth in case a  rm reports zero investment in two consecutive years. As robust-
ness check we further experiment with a second speci cation, imputing a small, but positive number
for investment in years t or t-1 in case a  rm reports in either of the two periods zero investment.
Given that this procedure leads to additional variability, for the analysis we cut the variable at the
 rst and 99th percentile to make the measure outlier proof. We  nd that our results are not a ected
by the speci cation of the dependent variable.
20Backtracking the capital stock using inventory methods would be only meaningful for balanced data
or data with few gaps.
9
Chapter 1. The investment e ect of  scal consolidation.
in planned investment. Formally, realized investment growth in year t is de ned as:
 ln(It) = ln(It,A)- ln(It-1,A) (1.1)
while the change in planned investment is de ned for reference year t, respectively in
each period p=1 between 1 October (t-1) and 31 March (t) and p=2 between 1 April (t)
and 30 September (t), as:
 ln(PIt,1) = ln(PI
t
t,S)- ln(PI
t
t-1,A) (1.2)
 ln(PIt,2) = ln(PI
t
t,A)- ln(PI
t
t,S) (1.3)
where the subscript indicate the year and the survey round (S=spring, A=autumn) when
the plan is revealed, while the superscript refers to the forecast horizon, i.e. the year the
investment is supposed to take place. The exact timing of the half-yearly investment
structure is depicted in Figure 6 in the appendix.
1.2.3 Summary statistics and representativeness
Table 1.1 shows the main variables of interest for our analysis at annual frequency for
the full sample period and two subsample periods 1970-1990 (West Germany only) and
1991-2010. The main dependent variable, realized investment growth is small in abso-
lute terms, however as the standard error suggests there exists considerable variation
across  rms. The alternative measure (investment over average capital stock) has a
mean of 0.25 (median of 0.18), which however includes more bigger  rms. The exoge-
nous  scal shock measured in terms of total value added in the manufacturing industry
is very similar for the two time periods in terms of the average, however the standard
error in the later period (1991-2010) is almost the double. For comparative purposes
Table 1.1 also reports the aggregate control variables for the interest rate as well as
sales growth and  rm size (number of employees), as these variables are reported for all
 rms in the questionnaire 21. While the interest rate has been around 1% higher in the
early subsample (1970-1991), average sales growth was nearly double compared to the
second sample period. These tendencies are related to general structural changes in the
German economy.
21As mentioned, other  nancial covariates, such as assets and liabilities, are only available for a subset
of  rms (those listed in either Amadeus or Hoppenstedt and that could be merged).
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Mean% std Mean% std Mean% std
Realized%investment%change 20.0110 (21.046) 0.0297 (0.965) 20.0424 (1.104)
Investment%/%Average%total%assets 0.2520 (0.229) 0.2580 (0.234) 0.2487 (0.226)
Exogeneous%fiscal%shock 0.0011 (20.006) 0.0013 (0.004) 0.0010 (0.007)
3%month%interbank%rate 2.4670 (21.616) 3.0911 (1.904) 2.0205 (1.186)
Sales%growth 0.0231 (20.261) 0.0312 (0.225) 0.0164 (0.288)
Total%employment%last%year 837 (5195) 948 (5247) 753 (5154)
Observations 64310 27936 36374
Note:%Investment%/%Average%total%assets%counts%with%a%total%of%39751%observations.
Total&sample:&197002010 Subsample:&199102010Subsample:&197001990
Table 1.1: Summary statistics: main variables
In order to provide further evidence on the representativeness of our data, Figure 1.7
in the appendix compares realized changes in aggregate investment in the manufactur-
ing sector in Germany obtained from STAN (OECD, Rev.3 2008) with aggregation based
on our sample data. The  gure indicates that the series co-move closely over the entire
sample period but that our aggregation based on  rm data shows slightly more variabil-
ity than the o cial statistics. Furthermore the appendix provides some  rst evidence for
the negative correlation of our  scal shock measure and aggregate investment growth.
The two series show a correlation coe cient of -0.15 (Figure 1.8). We present the same
evidence by ISIC 3 industry sub-sector and by size group (Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 in
the appendix).
1.3 Identi cation and empirical speci cation
As pointed out above, the key assumption behind the narrative approach is that both
the tax changes itself and their composition are "exogenous" i.e. tax changes are not
dictated by business cycle  uctuations nor long-term growth concerns. In line with the
previous literature (see for example Cloyne and Surico (2013)), we test for exogeneity
using a four-variable VAR at annual frequency including the tax shock series (for both
the endogenous and exogenous category), GDP growth, the three month interbank rate
and the average investment change as main dependent variable 22. We construct the
aggregate change in investment as log di erence of average investment in period t and
22In an alternative speci cation, we also account for the structural break due to the German reuni cation
(1990) and the recent  nancial and economic crisis (post 2007); our results are robust to the inclusion
of these exogenous dummies.
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t-1 weighted by employment shares 23. The selection-order criterion suggests in most
speci cations unanimously a lag structure of order one for the VAR. Table 1.3 in the
appendix provides evidence from the granger causality tests, showing that the exoge-
nous tax shock series implemented in the same period of the publication date cannot
be predicted neither by macroeconomic conditions in the last year, nor by past invest-
ment activity. On the other hand, the "endogenous" tax adjustments can be predicted by
economic growth (p-value 0.063). The three excluded series jointly (investment growth,
GDP growth and interest rate) moreover carry information to forecast the endogenous
 scal shock series at 10%. These results strongly support our key identi cation assump-
tions 24.
As second test for exogeneity of our  scal shock series we run an ordered probit re-
gression to see if the government’s decision to adjust taxes can be predicted by past
macroeconomic data. The same approach has been taken by Cloyne and Surico (2013)
and Mertens and Ravn (2009). We hence construct an indicator variable!t equal to 1 if
the government implements a positive  scal shock, zero if no action has taken place and
-1 if there has been a negative  scal adjustment. Results are presented in Table 1.4 in
the appendix and indicate that while movements in the exogenous shock cannot be pre-
dicted neither by lagged changes in aggregate investment nor by lagged levels of GDP,
the endogenous shocks are correlated to lagged investment growth. As additional test,
we run the ordered probit model on o cial data from the manufacturing sector (Table
1.5) using both changes in gross  xed capital formation (GFCF) and levels of GFCF from
the OECD (STAN) database. While the results for GFCF growth are fully comparable
with our in-sample  ndings (only lag 2 of GFCF growth) is signi cantly correlated with
the endogenous shock, for the levels equation we  nd strong evidence that movements
in the endogenous series are highly correlated with both lagged levels of investment
and GDP. The shocks that have been classi ed "exogenous" on the other hand are not
23We also test for other measures of aggregation, using changes in total investment from period t to
period t + 1, and hence conditioning on  rm presence in two consecutive years, or using simple
unweighted average investment change. The main results hold for all de nitions of aggregate invest-
ment. We furthermore test that the investment series are stationary, using an augmented Dickey-
Fuller test.
24Given the fact that our tax shock series includes both structural and consolidation motivated shocks,
as sensitivity check, we furthermore exclude all shocks with structural motivation. The presented
 ndings are robust to the selection of shocks.
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predictable.
Using the exogenous tax adjustment series, our analysis  rst focuses on the revision
of investment plans, and secondly, we study how realized investment is a ected. Both
analysis are based on the following main regression speci cation:
 Ii,j,t = ↵+  m(Lm)⌧t + mt-1 + ⇢gt-1 + ⌫ zi,t-1 +D90 +D07 + ✓j + ✏i,j,t
(1.4)
where  Ii,j,t is the growth rate of realized investment for  rm i, in sector j, in period
t. The investment changes are de ned separately for realized and planned investment as
introduced in section 1.2. The  scal shock ⌧t is the exogenous tax adjustment published
at time t, and is uncorrelated with other shocks to investment by construction. Macro-
level controls consist of the monetary policy stancemt-1 (previous period three-month
interbank rate) and economic condition gt-1 (lagged levels of GDP). Dummies to ac-
count for the crisis period 2007-2010 (D07) and for the structural change 1990 (D90) are
included in the regression equation25. Finally, lagged sales growth at  rm level ( zi,t-1)
is part of the regression controls to proxy for current and future demand conditions at
 rm level. In all speci cations we include furthermore sectorial  xed e ects ✓j and
standard errors are clustered at  rm level 26
1.4 Main regression results
The following section presents the main regression results for both planned and realized
investment growth at  rm level. Table 1.13 in the appendix also provides some evidence
for the e ect of  scal shocks on realized investment changes aggregated at sub-sector
level.
25To account for the structural break in the statistical data more than the actual historical date of the
German reuni cation.
26Given the fact that our main explanatory variable is aggregated at annual level, we potentially could
cluster on years, however clustering on year assumes that  rm level errors are uncorrelated from one
year to another, an assumption that is unlikely to hold. Alternatively we test for clustering at industry
sub-sector (branch). The main  ndings are una ected by the choice of the clustering variable.
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1.4.1 Planned investment
As previous contributions have suggested (see for example Alesina, Favero, and Gi-
avazzi (2012)), business con dence and private investment are found to be the main
drivers of the output e ect of  scal consolidation. Studying the change in future invest-
ment plans at micro level helps to understand and pin down the business expectation
and con dence channel. As mentioned in section 1.2, in the IVS  rms are asked about
their investment plans for next period. Given the opportunity cost of investments, these
plans, and in particular their revisions, incorporate business expectations and anticipa-
tion about future economic and policy conditions.
Insert Table 1.6 here
We observe updates on planned investment for the period 1993 to 2010 at a bi-annual
frequency. For this period, we count with a total of 10 exogenous  scal shocks with
a mean impact of 0.001 and a standard deviation of 0.0048. Moreover given the fact
that our analysis focuses on the announcement e ect of  scal policy, we use the shock
publication date. Table 1.6 presents the estimates of the e ect of a tax change equal to
1% of total manufacturing value added on the revision of planned investment. Block
1 (column (1) - (3)) includes only lags of the  scal shock, while block 2 (column (4) -
(6)) includes also leads. For the rest, the two blocks include the same set of covariates:
the  rst column of each block includes a set of aggregate controls (lagged GDP, lagged
three month interbank rate, and a dummy accounting for the recent  nancial crisis) in
addition to industry  xed-e ects, the second column includes additionally lagged  rm
level sales growth, and  nally the third column includes  rm level  xed e ects. In all
speci cations we furthermore include a separate dummy for the second half-year (au-
tumn), in order to account for potential di erences in volatility of the two revisions27,
which results to be highly signi cant in all speci cations.
Block 1 shows that there is a signi cant and negative e ect of tax shocks on planned
investment. A shock equal to one standard deviation of the exogenous  scal shock28
27Due to a lower degree of uncertainty, the autumn investment update might be more accurate and
hence less volatile than the spring update. The authors would like to thank Antonello d’Agostino for
pointing this out in his discussion at the Banca d’Italia Fiscal Policy Workshop 2014.
28As the shock can take on both positive and negative values, we standardize using a standard deviation
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hence translates to a decrease in planned investment of around 1.2% in the next invest-
ment plan. Once we additionally include leads, in order to test for a potential anticipa-
tion e ect in block 2, the lagged e ect on planned investment becomes quantitatively
larger. We furthermore con rm that agents anticipate the  scal adjustment as both lead
1 and 2 show up to be signi cant in all three speci cations. Note additionally that all
control variables (but lagged GDP in some speci cations) show up to be statistically
signi cant with the expected sign. The R2 is low even when including  rm level  xed
e ects, which indicates that investment changes are indeed very lumpy and volatile 29.
The forward looking behavior of the  rms can be explained by the average length
of the legislative process for tax changes in Germany. To test this hypothesis we in-
vestigate in a more detailed fashion the legislative timing, starting from the moment
when the draft of the law is discussed in the public (media coverage in major German
newspapers and news magazines). Therefore we search for news contents related to
the discussion of  scal shock measures employing the database LexisNexis 30. In fact
we  nd clear evidence that between the time of public discussion and publication of
the law, on average, there passes one year. Compared to the draft date, the date when
the law is o cially introduced in the parliamentary discussion, the public discussion
happens around half a year earlier. Table 1.2 in the appendix provides an overview of
mayor exogenous tax shocks since 1992 including their o cial publication dates, draft
dates and periods of public discussion in the media (discussion dates). Given these  nd-
ings, we re-estimate our main regression model focusing on the discussion date as "true"
announcement date of the shock.
The results are reported in Table 1.7. We  nd that once we consider the media dis-
cussion date, controlling for  rm-level sales growth or using  rm-level  xed e ects, no
forward lag shows up to be signi cant. In fact compared to the publication date, the
 scal shock is only signi cantly (and negatively) correlated with changes in planned
measure. Alternatively we could use the mean of the absolute shock impact in order to quantify the
shock impact on investment growth, which is very similar in magnitude.
29Note furthermore that the R2 from the  rm level  xed e ect regressions, column (3) and (6) are adjusted
and hence lower than the other columns, that report an unadjusted regression  t.
30LexiNexis contains all major German newspaper and covers news contents from the beginning of the
1990s.
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investment at impact, i.e. when the news is announced. 31 Generally, using the discus-
sion date, we  nd quantitatively similar, but more stable e ects of downward revision
of -3.5% to -4% for a shock equal to 1% value added in the manufacturing industry. A
shock equal to one standard deviation hence led to a downward revision of investment
plans by 1.9% for the sample period 1993-2010.
Insert Table 1.7 here
To sum up, when  rms make their plans for next period investment, they are in u-
enced by laws currently under discussion and laws published in the previous half year.
Given the fact that we are interested in identifying the announcement e ect of  scal
consolidation measures on planned and realized investment, we hence use the discus-
sion date as main speci cation in the remaining sections of this paper.
1.4.2 Realized investment
After analyzing  rm behavior in terms of investment expectation, it is interesting to ap-
ply a similar analysis to realized investment in order to be able to compare our  ndings
with the previous macro-level results. We consider  rms’ annual investment growth
from 1970 to 2010 as de ned in section 1.2. Table 1.8 presents the point estimates of
the e ect of a tax change equal to 1% of total manufacturing value added on investment
growth. Column (1) does not include any controls while column(2) includes aggregate
controls and column (3) furthermore lagged sales growth at  rm level. Column (4)
presents the results for realized investment for the period 1991-2010, while column (5)
for the earlier period and Western Germany alone (1970-1990).
Insert Table 1.8 here
Interestingly, we  nd that the  scal shock has a negative and signi cant impact on
realized investment that is strongest in the year of public discussion32 but has also a
31We also tried alternative speci cations including additional lags up to lag 4, but the only signi cant
impact remains at lag zero.
32Using as true announcement date the date of public discussion as introduced in the previous section.
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lagged e ect. The initial impact is stable to the inclusion of additional aggregate and
 rm level controls (column 2 and 3), however once we include the set of controls, we
 nd a more persistent e ect. Adding up the signi cant lags in column 3, the total impact
of a one percent tax shock on investment growth is around -15.6%, which however is
smaller when evaluated at the mean absolute impact or the standard deviation measure:
-5.7%. In fact, for the annual shock series, there are a total of 19  scal shocks with a
mean value of 0.0007 and a standard deviation of 0.0037. All aggregate control variables
show up to be signi cant and show the expected sign. The sample split in column 4 and
5 suggests two clearly di erent patterns: while in the more recent period 1991-2010,
the  scal shock shows quantitatively the same impact as for the entire sample period
(-8.8%), the earlier subsample shows a signi cant lagged e ect that is biggest at lag 1.
As for the half yearly analysis there are 10 shocks for the subsample post 1991, with a
mean impact of 0.00096 (0.0047) and 9 shocks for the  rst subsample referring to col-
umn 5 with a mean impact of 0.0004 (0.0027). Hence the di erent  scal policy over the
period considered translates into bigger and more volatile shocks in more recent years.
In addition to di erences in the  scal shock series,  rms might have changed their be-
havior over the last 20 years, using more technology and respond faster to changes in
the companies legal and  scal environment.
Generally, the results are in line with the macro level  ndings even though the mag-
nitudes are not directly comparable. Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2012) for instance
 nd that a one percent GDP tax shock has a negative and signi cant lagged e ect on
 xed capital formation growth in Germany that increases from -4% in the  rst quarter
after the adjustment to around -6% one year after the adjustment. In fact, while in the
macro literature the shock is standardized by GDP, in our micro set-up it makes more
sense to re-scale the expected budgetary impact using the value added of the total man-
ufacturing sector. Moreover, another di erence between our framework and the macro
analysis is the di erence in timing.
In order to verify that  scal shocks, de ned as exogenous, are not correlated with the
shocks that were announced in the past but implemented at time t, we reestimate our
regression model including both the previously announced shocks and in a second step
also the shocks that we classi ed as endogenous. Running our main speci cation (col-
umn (3), containing both aggregate and  rm level controls), and including the shocks
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previously identi ed as endogenous, we get results very much in line with those pre-
sented in Table 1.7. While the leads do not show up to be signi cant, at impact we
estimate an e ect of -7.65, at lag1 of -5.87 and at lag 2 of -2.95, all signi cant at 1%33. On
the other hand, including the anticipated tax shocks, we con rm these  ndings: while
the leads are not statistically signi cant, at impact we estimate an e ect of -8.29, at lag1
of -6.39 and at lag2 of -4.89. These  ndings can be seen as a  rst robustness check for
our main regression results.34
While section 1.5 reports the results for heterogeneity of realized investment changes
depending on type of tax adjustment,  rm size and the sub-sector of the manufactur-
ing industry, section 1.6 performs further robustness checks, providing also evidence
for the negative and signi cant e ect of tax adjustments using a rigorous di erence-in-
di erence strategy that allows us controlling for other unobserved factors potentially
correlated with the  scal shock series and investment growth.
1.5 Heterogeneous e ects
The long time span of available data for realized investment growth allows us studying
the e ect of tax changes by looking at three main dimensions: type of tax adjustment,
heterogeneous e ects by  rm size and by manufacturing sub-sector as well as their in-
teractions.
Looking at GDP per capita, Johansson (2008)  nd that corporate taxes are most harm-
ful for growth, followed by personal income taxes and consumption taxes. To test for
the e ect of exogenous tax changes on realized investment we group the shocks in dif-
ferent categories. As depicted in Figure 1.2, we distinguish three main tax categories:
• personal income tax, pension & savings tax
• corporate & business tax, energy tax, property tax
33This results hold independent of the inclusion of control variables.
34Table 1.13 presents the e ects of  scal consolidation at industry level, provides similar evidence. In-
cluding previously announced shocks or shocks considered endogenous does not alter our main  nd-
ings.
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Figure 1.2: Exogenous tax adjustments; by tax type
• consumption tax
Breaking down the tax shock into these subcategories, we are able to distinguish 11
tax measures for the  rst category, 11 for category two and 7 for the third category. In
order to identify these categories we revised a total of 42 tax law changes that consist
of 184 individual tax measures.
Insert Table 1.9 here
Including the three  scal shock series in our reduced form estimation, both in the
same regression (Table 1.9, column 1) and in separate regressions, we  nd important
di erences with respect to the previous estimates found in Johansson (2008): consump-
tion tax shocks have a strong negative and lagged impact, while tax adjustments a ect-
ing income tax seem to have the biggest impact within the same year. Property and
corporate taxes, on the other hand, have a smaller e ect at impact. These  ndings sup-
port a recent hypothesis35 which highlights the importance of the demand channel for
the transmission of  scal shocks. Consumption taxes a ect demand and consequently
35See for example the discussion of Aghion and Kharroubi (2013) at the annual BIS conference (June
2013) by Reichlin.
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 rms’ investment in the successive periods through future demand expectations.
In order to compare our results with the aggregate  ndings on realized investment
(section 1.4), we look at the standard deviation measure of the distinct categories of  s-
cal shocks and  nd that while income (0.0021) and property (0.0022) adjustments nearly
have the same variability, consumption shocks are smaller, almost half (0.0011). Using
the estimated coe cients from column (1) this leads to an e ect of a standard deviation
 scal adjustment on investment growth of -4.1% for income tax, -1.76% for property tax
and -1.9% for consumption tax. In order to contrast these results, we aggregate  scal
shocks in an alternative way, considering income and property tax as direct taxes and
the consumption tax as indirect taxes. Results are presented in Table 1.10 and show the
same pattern that is stable to the inclusion of additional controls,  xed e ects and also
to the inclusion of previously excluded tax shocks. While direct taxes show a negative
e ect at impact, indirect taxes only lead to a downward revision of realized investment
in the subsequent period, and hence providing further evidence for the demand channel
hypothesis.
Recent  rm-level literature has furthermore stressed the importance of considering
heterogeneous and distributional e ects of  scal and other policies in general. To test
for di erent impact in terms of  rm size we use the IFO  rm class sizes of employees (1-
49, 50-199, 200-999, >1000) and run the regression for each subgroup separately. Given
the potential residual correlation across size classes, we adopted a seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) framework. The results highlighted in Figure 1.3 show that at impact
all size classes are negatively and signi cantly a ected by the tax adjustment. Further-
more the e ects are larger for  rms that belong to size group 1 to 3. The largest  rms
show the smallest coe cient. Moreover we con rm that the lagged e ect is present for
all size classes but for the smallest  rms (size group 1), where lag1 does not show up to
be signi cant. This  nding might be due to the fact that the smallest group is highly
heterogeneous, as it is also suggested by the wide con dence band. The magnitude of
the e ect is in line with the aggregate  ndings for the impact and slightly larger for lag1.
In a next step, we investigate if distinct tax shocks have di erent e ects by  rm size.
The tax e ects might di er as  rm size can be also seen as a proxy for legal status.
Figure 1.4 shows the results for direct and indirect tax shocks at impact and for lag1 for
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the distinct size groups. As pointed out above, given the strong heterogeneity in the
smallest size group, we cannot con rm any signi cant e ect for either tax category. On
the other hand we do con rm the main pattern that we found when looking at type of
tax shocks. Direct tax adjustments have a negative impact at lag 0 that is quantitatively
smaller than the impact for indirect (consumption) taxes at lag 1. Furthermore the im-
pact is larger for smaller  rms (coe cient for size group 2 > size 3 > size 4, for both
direct and indirect taxes), which might indicate that smaller  rms are on average more
credit constraint and hence a  scal shock translates to a stronger e ect (see Zwick and
Mahon (Working Paper) for recent evidence from the US).
A  nal dimension of heterogeneity that we test is the response by sub-sectors of the
manufacturing industry. For that purpose, we divide the  rms in our sample into 12
sub-sectors based on the two-digit ISIC 3 classi cation with some aggregations36. We
apply the same SUR methodology as used for  rm size, and regress investment growth
on contemporaneous and lagged  scal shocks, including furthermore our set of control
variables. The results for lag 0 are displayed in Figure 1.5 37. We  nd that almost all
sub-sectors show a negative and signi cant impact at lag 0, but the sub-sectors "food,
beverages & tobacco", "leather", "non-metallic mineral products", and "transport equip-
ment"38. The signi cant coe cients range from -5 to -11 and are hence in line with our
previous  ndings.
Using the narrative identi cation for  scal shocks allows us considering and aggre-
gating a wide range of shocks, and thus identifying a robust average e ect of tax ad-
justments; however, at the same time, and given the shock heterogeneity, the narrative
36The manufacturing industries covered are food, beverages and tobacco (1516), textiles and wearing
apparel (1718), Leather industry (1900), wood (2000), pulp, paper and printing (2122), chemical, rub-
ber, plastics and fuel products (2325), other non-metallic mineral products (2600), basic metals and
fabricated metal products (2728), machinery and equipment n.e.c. (2900), machinery and equipment
(3033), transport equipment (3435) and manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling (3637).
37For lag one we only  nd a signi cant (and negative) e ect for sub-sectors 1718, 2122, 2900, and 3033.
38While "food, beverages & tobacco" are a very heterogeneous group of  rms, "leather" and "non-metallic
mineral products" are very small and specialized sub-sectors within the German manufacturing in-
dustry. The fact that we do not  nd a signi cant e ect for the transport equipment sector might
be related to the strong export orientation of this sub sector, which includes the entire German car
industry.
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Figure 1.3: Heterogeneous e ect by  rm class size
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Figure 1.4: Heterogeneous e ect by size and tax type
approach makes it di cult to pin down a single channel.
1.6 Robustness
1.6.1 Sensitivity analysis
In addition to the  rst model checks presented in the main section, we further elaborate
on robustness in the present section. First, given the strong impact that the recent  -
nancial and economic crisis had on the economic activity in Germany (negative changes
in realized investment of around 30 % in 2009 alone), a  rst sensitivity check consists of
excluding the period 2007-2010 from our analysis. As pointed out in the methodological
22
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Figure 1.5: Heterogeneous e ect by ISIC sector classi cation: at impact
section, in the original regression speci cation we already control with a dummy for
the recent crisis period, however excluding the period completely represents a good ro-
bustness check for our  ndings. Dropping the period post 2007, we are left with 38,950
observations. For our preferred regression speci cation, including both aggregate and
 rm-level controls we  nd that the leads are not predictable and that the estimated co-
e cients for the  scal shocks show the same sign and magnitude as before: -8.76, -5.54,
and -3.05 for lag 0 to lag 2.
Another important robustness check is to exclude the biggest single sub-sector within
manufacturing (manufacture of machinery and equipment) and to see if our results are
stable. Dropping 17,710 observations from the annual dataset does not a ect our re-
sults to an important degree and the estimated coe cients are directly aligned with our
analysis of annual realized investment changes: -7.99, -4.21, and -2.96 for lag 0 to lag 2.
Moreover, given the potential concern that structural shocks di er from consolidation
shocks in their nature, i.e. they are based on "structural" considerations, these shocks
might be correlated to past output and investment levels. We hence exclude them from
our regression analysis and re-estimate the model using only shocks that are labeled
unambiguously consolidation shocks in both Uhl (2013) and our classi cation. Again,
our results are strongly aligned with the ones presented previously.
Finally, and in order to follow the literature on  rm level investment, we model  rm
investment as in Bond, Harho , and van Reenen (2005). We hence estimate a dynamic
model of  rm investment focusing on the investment rate rather than on investment
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growth 39. Due to data availably, we normalize investment by average assets of the
company rather than by the capital stock at time t - 1. The investment model speci-
 es that current investment, the dependent variable, is explained by lagged investment,
current and lagged sales growth, levels of sales, current and lagged cash  ow to capital
ratio and the second lag of the di erence between capital stock and sales (k - y). As
explained in Bond, Harho , and van Reenen (2005), for consistency with the error cor-
rection speci cation, we require the coe cient of (k - y) to be negative. For stability
we furthermore require that the coe cient of lagged investment is lower than one in
absolute terms.
As the investment rate depends on investment in the previous period, the model has
to be estimated by general method of moments (GMM) 40. Given the fact that the GMM
estimator is a large N, small T estimator, we focus on the sample period 1991 to 2004
in order to maximize the numbers of tax shocks and  rm observations, but repeat the
exercise for the full sample with very similar  ndings. In a  rst step, we estimate the
model as in Bond, Harho , and van Reenen (2005), including time  xed e ects, in or-
der to account for the economic cycle and other unobserved factors (Table 1.11, column
1). In order to estimate the e ect of our annualized  scal shocks, we replace the time
 xed e ects by aggregate controls (column 2) and con rm that the main results do not
change. Finally, the  scal shock is included in column (3). Similar to our previous  nd-
ings on investment growth, we  nd a negative and signi cant e ect for  scal shocks
on the investment rate at impact and lag1. The coe cients can be interpreted as a 1%
tax adjustment in terms of VA in the manufacturing industry leads to a decrease in in-
vestment by -1.4% at impact and -1.1% at lag one, and hence a total aggregate e ect of
-2.5%. The test statistics for column 3 indicate that the Hansen-statistic of non-valid
instruments can be rejected, while the model shows clear evidence of autocorrelation
only at lag1.41.
39The interested reader is referred to Bond, Harho , and van Reenen (2005), where the error correction
model of  rm investment is derived in detail.
40For e ciency considerations, we adopt the system GMM approach as in Bond, Harho , and van
Reenen (2005)
41As additional model check we ignore the potential correlation between lagged investment and the error
term and estimate the investment equation by both OLS and  xed e ect regression. Given the induced
bias the true value for lagged investment should be in-between the two naive approaches. We  nd
that his is the case with an OLS estimate of 0.45 and FE estimate of 0.09 for the lagged investment
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1.6.2 Towards a causal interpretation
Using a narrative identi cation strategy for  scal shocks should overcome any type of
endogeneity by construction. Nevertheless, taking advantage of the micro-level dataset
and the detailed shock breakdown, we can provide further evidence that the investment
response is indeed driven by the  scal shock and that there are no unobserved factors
driving the investment response, using a di erence-in-di erence approach. In order to
do so, we focus on one speci c type of shock that is likely to a ect only some sub-
sectors of the manufacturing industry. This identi cation strategy can help us to get
closer to a causal interpretation of investment impact of  scal consolidation.
For this purpose, we focus on tax changes that a ect the cost of energy. Our as-
sumption is that controlling for a set of aggregate and  rm level factors, some energy
intensive sectors will be highly a ected by this type of tax adjustment, while other
sectors will not respond to this tax change. Key is that both sectors, belonging to the
manufacturing industry, share the same unobserved trends and hence any di erence in
outcome can be assigned to the e ect of the tax shock. The pulp and paper industry
seems a good candidate to test this hypothesis, given its high energy dependence42. As
control groups we consider the food and tobacco industry (ISIC 1516) and the group of
non-classi ed manufacturing (ISIC 3637). Even though some  rms in the food and to-
bacco industry might be dependent on energy in their production process, both control
sectors are highly heterogeneous in terms of products and production processes and
hence it is likely for energy tax changes not to show any aggregate e ect.
Our "treatment" group "paper" consists of 10,357 observations and the combined
group of "controls" has a total of 10,946 observations for the sample period 1970-2010.
For this period we count a total of 4 energy shocks43. Investment change for the en-
coe cient.
42On a worldwide scale the pulp and paper industry is considered the  fth largest consumer of energy.
One additional advantage of the pulp and paper industry is that the products and manufacturing
processes are highly standardized and hence a shock on energy prices (tax increase) is likely to a ect
all companies in the industry in a very similar fashion.
43Shocks in 1972, 1980, 1987 and 2001. Given the small number of shocks, we focus on realized invest-
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tire sample period for the control group has a mean value of -0.012 (1.01) and for the
treatment group 0.001 (1.36). The regression results are reported in Table 1.12, where
the  rst column (1) refers to a pooled regression, column (2) includes  xed e ects for
the individual sub-branches summarized in the two categories, and column (3) includes
 rm level  xed e ects. The results show that there exists a strong negative lagged e ect
for pulp and paper, while the control sector does not show any signi cant response to
energy tax increases. Adding  rm level  xed e ects in column (3) alters the estimated
coe cients only slightly, but leads to a higher level of signi cance for lag 1. In order to
compare the magnitude of the coe cients with our previous  ndings, we evaluate them
at the mean impact of energy shocks. Given a standard deviation of energy shocks of
0.002,  rms in the pulp and paper industry respond to an average shock by reducing
their investment growth by -4.8%. The results are hence highly aligned with our previ-
ous  ndings.
1.7 Conclusion
Private investment has been shown to be one of the main drivers of aggregate output
during periods of  scal consolidation. Nevertheless, previous literature has failed to pro-
vide a causal link between  scal adjustment, business con dence and  rm investment.
The urge for understanding this channel is even more relevant in periods of excessive
debt and/or de cit when the economy needs an e ective growth policy agenda.
Based on a detailed narrative record for tax changes in Germany ( Uhl (2013)), we
reclassify 40 years of  scal shocks into "exogenous" and "endogenous" changes with
respect to investment and to the contingent state of the economy. Exploiting this ex-
ogenous variation, we study the e ect of a tax change on  rms’ realized and planned
investment, considering the IFO investment survey dataset. We  nd that recently pub-
lished laws and laws under current discussion in the media and in the parliament shape
future investment plans. Taking into account the forward looking behavior and adjust-
ing the announcement dates according, we  nd that an increase in tax equal to 1% of the
value added of the total manufacturing industry leads to a lagged decrease in planned
ment changes rather than updates in planned investment.
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investment of about 4%. For realized investment growth we estimate an average e ect
of 8%
Finally, the use of micro-level  rm data allows us to elaborate further on heterogene-
ity in terms of  rm size, industry sub sector as well as by type of tax shock. Di erently
from the previous literature, we  nd that consumption taxes and income tax adjust-
ments are most harmful for growth as they have the strongest negative and persistent
e ect on investment growth at  rm level. The  nding thus support recent hypotheses
that highlight the importance of the demand channel in the transmission of  scal poli-
cies, and may act through future demand expectation.
1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Narrative &  rm investment data
This section shows some examples of tax changes as discussed and classi ed in Uhl
(2013). For our purpose of analyzing the e ect of exogenous  scal tax changes on in-
vestment we revise all structural and consolidation tax measures in Uhl and reclassify
them accordingly in "endogenous" and "exogenous" measures.
An example for an exogenous structural tax measure is given by shock number 20
in Uhl (2013) ,"Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der oekologischen Steuerreform". It cor-
responds to the continuation of the ecological tax reform, published on 22 December
1999, with a total budgetary impact of 10,635 billion Euros it represents a tax measure
with structural motivation that is included in our analysis. Even though the revenues
from the original ecological tax reform were aimed at reforming the retirement scheme
in Germany from a pure pay-as-you go system to a more capital oriented system (the
so-called "Riester Rente"), and hence might have indirect impact on investment, the con-
tinuation law discussed here did not directly contribute to the structural reform of the
pension scheme, and revenues were not used to reduce the contribution rates to the so-
cial security system. The main argument that dominated the parliamentary debate was
that that additional block grants were used to avoid future increases. We label the tax
measure structural and include it in our analysis.
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Figure 1.6: Timing of the half-yearly investment survey
On the contrary, shock number 28 in Uhl (2013) " Gesetz zur Senkung der Steuer-
saetze und zur Reform der Unternehmensbesteuerung", represents a good example of
structural shock that we consider endogenous, di erently from Uhl (2013) . It refers
to a law that has the objective to decrease taxes and reform company taxation (pub-
lished in October 2000). This law implemented one of the most extensive tax reforms
in Germany and substantially reduced income - and corporate tax burden. Furthermore
the corporate tax imputation system was replaced by a 50 percent income taxation rule.
The introduction of the bill clearly postulated that the motivation behind the law is
to promote growth and employment by reducing the tax burden. Tax reductions were
supposed to stimulate consumption, employment and investment. Therefore we do not
included it in our analysis as it is directly aimed at increasing  rm investment activity.
Finally, a good example for a consolidation shock is given by shock number 62 in
Uhl (2013), a law published in March 1981, with the objective to increase petroleum
tax and taxes on spirits (Mineraloel und Branntweinsteuer-Aenderungsgesetz 1981). As
pointed out in Uhl (2013), the main motivation behind the law was budgetary consoli-
dation. Although structural e ects cannot be excluded completely (in order to improve
the structure of tax revenues), consolidation considerations dominated the discussion.
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1.8.2 Summary statistics
This section presents evidence for the representativeness of our sample data for the
overall manufacturing sector in Germany. We compare aggregate  rm level data, ob-
tained as log di erence of total change at time t and time t-1 (d_inv_t) and a size-
weighted average measure of investment changes (d_inv_a_w), with the benchmark
for realized investment changes (gross  xed capital formation data obtained from STAN
Industry Rev.3 2008 (OECD).
Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 present results from the aggregate VAR analysis and pro-
vide evidence that the shock series cannot be predicted by macroeconomic variables or
lagged investment changes. On the other hand, all announced shocks at time t seem to
have an impact on changes in investment (Table 1.4); the null hypothesis of no granger
causality can be rejected at the 10% signi cance level.
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Figure 1.7: Change in aggregate investment: STAN vs. sample aggregation
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Figure 1.10: Change in aggregate investment by size class vs. exogenous  scal shock
series
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob4>4chi2 Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob4>4chi2
Exog.4fiscal4shock Interest4rate4(3month) 0.003 1 0.959 Endog.4fiscal4shock Interest4rate4(3month) 2.572 1 0.109
Exog.4fiscal4shock GDP4growth 0.689 1 0.407 Endog.4fiscal4shock GDP4growth 3.447 1 0.063
Exog.4fiscal4shock Change4in4investment 0.172 1 0.678 Endog.4fiscal4shock Change4in4investment 2.141 1 0.143
Exog.4fiscal4shock ALL 1.461 3 0.691 Endog.4fiscal4shock ALL 6.283 3 0.099
D.investment Exog.4fiscal4shock 0.020 1 0.887 D.investment Endog.4fiscal4shock 0.297 1 0.586
D.investment Interest4rate4(3month) 1.426 1 0.232 D.investment Interest4rate4(3month) 1.040 1 0.308
D.investment GDP4growth 1.620 1 0.203 D.investment GDP4growth 1.964 1 0.161
D.investment ALL 2.732 3 0.435 D.investment ALL 3.028 3 0.387
Exogenous4fiscal4shock4and4investment4change4(394obs.) Endogenous4fiscal4shock4and4investment4change4(394obs.)
Table 1.3: Granger causality test based on 4 variable VAR
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Dependent'variable:'Exogenous'fiscal'shock Dependent'variable:'Endogenous'fiscal'shock
beta se beta se
L.1'Change'in'investment >2.626 (2.108) L.1'Change'in'investment >0.335 (>2.005)
L.2'Change'in'investment 1.670 (1.942) L.2'Change'in'investment '''''4.766** (>2.099)
L.1'GDP 0.000 (0.000) L.1'GDP 0.000 (0.000)
L.2'GDP 0.000 (0.000) L.2'GDP 0.000 (0.000)
Observations 39 Observations 39
Pseudo'R2 0.06 Pseudo'R2 0.09
For'the'sample'period'1970>2010'there'are'6'negative For'the'sample'period'1970>2010'there'are'14'negative
adjustment,'25'periods'of'no'action'and'10'years adjustment,'15'periods'of'no'action'and'12'years
with'positive'shocks. with'positive'shocks.
Table 1.4: Ordered Probit: Insample
Dependent'variable:'Exogenous'fiscal'shock Dependent'variable:'Endogenous'fiscal'shock
beta se beta se
L.1'GFCF ?2.93E?11 (7.81e?11) L.1'GFCF 1.82E?10** (8.15E?11)
L.2'GFCF 5.03E?11 (6.73e?11) L.2'GFCF ?7.13E?11 (6.71E?11)
L.1'GDP ?.000 (0.000) L.1'GDP ?0.002** (0.001)
L.2'GDP 0.000 (0.000) L.2'GDP 0.001** (0.001)
Observations 38 Observations 38
Pseudo'R2 0.05 Pseudo'R2 0.12
For'the'sample'period'1970?2010'there'are'6'negative For'the'sample'period'1970?2010'there'are'14'negative
adjustment,'25'periods'of'no'action'and'10'years adjustment,'15'periods'of'no'action'and'12'years
with'positive'shocks. with'positive'shocks.
Table 1.5: Ordered Probit: O cial Statistics (OECD STAN)
34
Chapter 1. The investment e ect of  scal consolidation.
Ta
bl
e
1.
6:
Re
vi
si
on
in
pl
an
ne
d
in
ve
st
m
en
t
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ria
bl
e:
Re
vi
si
on
in
pl
an
ne
d
in
ve
st
m
en
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
 
/(
SE
)
 
/(
SE
)
 
/(
SE
)
 
/(
SE
)
 
/(
SE
)
 
/(
SE
)
F2
. 
sc
al
sh
oc
k
–5
.5
20
**
*
–4
.0
21
*
–5
.0
12
**
(2
.0
76
)
(2
.1
48
)
(2
.1
75
)
F.
 s
ca
ls
ho
ck
–2
.9
45
*
–4
.1
41
**
–4
.0
33
**
(1
.7
69
)
(1
.8
30
)
(1
.9
28
)
Fi
sc
al
sh
oc
k
–1
.6
01
0.
10
3
–0
.3
98
0.
05
0
2.
50
4
1.
83
8
(2
.1
70
)
(2
.2
64
)
(2
.3
70
)
(2
.0
71
)
(2
.1
84
)
(2
.2
01
)
L.
 s
ca
ls
ho
ck
–2
.5
73
*
–3
.7
50
**
–2
.1
49
–5
.2
93
**
*
–6
.5
75
**
*
–5
.8
16
**
*
(1
.5
44
)
(1
.7
55
)
(1
.8
92
)
(1
.6
31
)
(1
.6
91
)
(1
.9
01
)
L2
. 
sc
al
sh
oc
k
–1
.5
87
–2
.0
18
–0
.7
94
–0
.1
87
–0
.3
25
0.
28
9
(1
.6
81
)
(1
.8
15
)
(1
.8
33
)
(1
.6
79
)
(1
.7
90
)
(1
.8
39
)
D
um
m
y_
au
tu
m
n
0.
09
5*
**
0.
09
9*
**
0.
10
2*
**
0.
08
3*
**
0.
08
4*
**
0.
08
6*
**
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
15
)
D
um
m
y_
cr
is
is
–0
.0
89
**
*
–0
.0
61
**
*
–0
.0
50
**
–0
.1
30
**
*
–0
.1
16
**
*
–0
.1
13
**
*
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
23
)
L.
G
D
P
0.
00
0
–0
.0
00
–0
.0
00
*
0.
00
0*
**
0.
00
0*
0.
00
0
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
L.
3
m
on
th
in
te
rb
an
k
ra
te
–0
.0
30
**
*
–0
.0
42
**
*
–0
.0
31
**
–0
.0
25
**
*
–0
.0
26
**
*
–0
.0
27
**
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
12
)
L.
Sa
le
s
gr
ow
th
0.
09
0*
**
0.
04
6
0.
10
0*
**
0.
06
1*
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
32
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
25
18
9
19
52
5
19
52
5
23
15
1
19
52
5
19
52
5
R2
0.
00
6
0.
00
9
0.
00
7
0.
00
7
0.
00
9
0.
00
6
In
du
st
ry
FE
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Fi
rm
FE
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
*
p
<
0.
1,
**
p
<
0.
05
,*
**
p
<
0.
01
.C
lu
st
er
ed
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
at
 r
m
le
ve
li
n
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
35
Chapter 1. The investment e ect of  scal consolidation.
Table 1.7: Halfyearly: discussion date of the  scal shock
Dependent variable:
Revision in planned investment (1) (2) (3)
  / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)
F2. scal shock –4.831** –3.149 –3.268
(2.452) (2.551) (2.645)
F. scal shock 1.566 1.632 0.933
(2.265) (2.287) (2.406)
Fiscal shock –4.132*** –3.418** –3.941**
(1.498) (1.565) (1.590)
L. scal shock –1.548 –1.736 –1.810
(1.510) (1.564) (1.651)
L2. scal shock –1.910 –0.813 –1.012
(1.816) (1.888) (1.892)
Dummy_autumn 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.085***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Dummy_crisis –0.116*** –0.100*** –0.097***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
L.GDP 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.3 month interbank rate –0.017** –0.018** –0.020*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
L.Sales growth 0.095*** 0.056*
(0.028) (0.032)
Observations 23151 19525 19525
R2 0.007 0.008 0.006
Industry FE Y Y N
Firm FE N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at  rm level in
parentheses.
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Table 1.8: Annual: realized investment change
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)
F2. scal shock 2.659*** 1.239 0.584 2.126* 3.085
(0.922) (0.940) (0.945) (1.150) (2.022)
F. scal shock 0.895 0.056 –0.020 0.642 4.563**
(0.896) (0.904) (0.910) (1.208) (1.923)
Fiscal shock –8.949*** –8.502*** –8.724*** –8.789*** –2.359
(0.952) (0.960) (0.960) (1.245) (1.811)
L. scal shock –2.901*** –4.682*** –4.853*** –1.704 –7.072***
(0.849) (0.876) (0.883) (1.056) (1.824)
L2. scal shock 0.858 –1.757* –2.164** 0.529 –3.275*
(0.941) (0.986) (0.993) (1.248) (1.895)
Dummy_90 –0.270*** –0.276***
(0.018) (0.018)
Dummy_crisis –0.098*** –0.097*** 0.065 8.88
(0.032) (0.036) (0.051) 8.88
L.GDP 0.000*** 0.000*** –0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.3 month interbank rate –0.028*** –0.028*** –0.047*** –0.047***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005)
L.Sales growth 0.032 0.053 0.000
(0.031) (0.034) (0.056)
Observations 43738 43738 42046 23024 19022
R2 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.013
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at  rm level in parentheses.
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Table 1.9: Heterogeneous e ects: Tax type
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
  / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)
Income tax –13.956*** –18.096***
(2.298) (1.925)
L.Income tax –5.670** –5.808***
(2.403) (1.963)
Property and Corp tax –7.958*** –12.959***
(2.052) (1.575)
L.Property and Corp tax 0.947 –6.606***
(2.037) (1.474)
Consumption tax 0.176 –6.754***
(2.998) (2.533)
L.Consumption tax –17.392*** –17.800***
(3.044) (2.550)
Dummy_90 –0.225*** –0.213*** –0.239*** –0.191***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Dummy_crisis –0.227*** –0.207*** –0.240*** –0.216***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
L.GDP 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.3 month interbank rate –0.023*** –0.026*** –0.027*** –0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
L.Sales growth –0.002 –0.002 0.002 0.006
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Observations 54261 54261 54261 54261
R2 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006
Industry FE Y Y Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at  rm level in paren-
theses.
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Table 1.10: Heterogeneous e ects: direct vs. indirect taxes
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3)
  / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)
Direct taxes –9.720*** –10.228*** –9.869***
(1.086) (1.114) (1.102)
L.Direct taxes –0.906 –1.641 –0.959
(1.081) (1.106) (1.087)
Indirect taxes 3.054 2.449 3.298
(3.053) (3.097) (3.160)
L.Indirect taxes –16.265*** –15.903*** –16.055***
(2.778) (2.822) (2.844)
Observations 53164 53164 53164
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01
Controls Y Y Y
Anticipated shocks N N Y
Industry FE Y N Y
Firm FE N Y N
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at
 rm level in parentheses.
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Table 1.11: Results from GMM Model (Bond et. al (2003))
Dependent variable:
Investment / Assets (1) (2) (3)
  / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)
L. Investment / Assets 0.222*** 0.218*** 0.236***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Sales growth 0.294*** 0.256*** 0.254***
(0.088) (0.081) (0.111)
L.Sales growth 0.145*** 0.137*** 0.153***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.030)
L2.(Assets - Sales) –0.103*** –0.100*** –0.124***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.030)
F. scal shock –0.094
(1.001)
Fiscal shock –1.461**
(0.681)
L. scal shock –1.101*
(0.665)
Hansen (p-value) 0.01 0.05 0.13
Arellano-Bond (AR1) -17.34 -17.72 -15.91
Arellano-Bond (AR2) 1.67 1.75 1.76
Observations 10761 10761 9524
Firms 1875 1875 1798
Year FE Y N N
Aggregate controls N Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation by SYS-GMM using
the one-step estimator. Hansen test (p-value) for over identi-
 cation restrictions reported. We follow the same selection of
instruments as in Bond et. al (2003)
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Table 1.12: Results from Di -in-Di : Energy tax
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3)
(  / (SE) (  / (SE) (  / (SE)
Energy tax X paper industry 3.608 3.410 6.921
(13.553) (13.554) (14.011)
L.Energy tax X paper industry –23.134* –23.532* –24.323**
(12.269) (12.272) (12.289)
L2.Energy tax X paper industry –20.403 –20.356 –20.427
(12.683) (12.697) (13.105)
Energy tax –1.535 –1.517 –3.133
(8.436) (8.435) (8.806)
L.Energy tax 4.927 5.158 4.569
(7.952) (7.958) (7.972)
L2.Energy tax –10.747 –10.927 –12.773
(9.005) (9.020) (9.230)
Pulp & Paper 0.039***
(0.013)
Observations 12960 12960 12960
R2 0.004 0.004 0.004
Controls Y Y Y
Industry FE N Y N
Firm FE N N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at  rm level in
parentheses.
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Table 1.13: Aggretated results: by ISIC 3 subsector
Dependent variable:
Investment growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
  / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)
Fiscal shock –3.689*** –3.689*** –2.301* –2.278**
(1.120) (0.816) (1.054) (0.864)
L. scal shock –2.674** –2.682*** –2.279** –2.958***
(1.182) (0.760) (0.772) (0.740)
L2. scal shock –.635 –0.640 –1.091 –1.493
(1.557) (2.124) (2.065) (2.021)
Fiscal shock anticipated –0.018
(0.689)
L. scal shock anticipated 0.181
(0.421)
L2. scal shock anticipated 2.011*
(0.989)
Fiscal shock endog. 1.209*
(0.649)
L. scal shock endog. –1.129
(0.679)
L2. scal shock endog. –3.316***
(0.589)
Dummy_90 –0.248*** –0.249*** –0.253*** –0.202***
(0.0402) (0.027) (0.029) (0.038)
Dummy_crisis –0.151*** –0.151*** –0.176*** –0.1678***
(0.043) (0.037) (0.046) (0.034)
L.GDP_index 0.696*** 0.697*** 0.689*** 0.589***
(0.135) (0.101) (0.097) (0.122)
L.3 month interbank rate –.0171*** –0.171*** –0.0183*** –0.011*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 465 465 465 465
R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.16
Industry FE N Y Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors at  rm level in parenthe-
ses.
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Chapter 2
Policy Uncertainty and Investment in Low-
Carbon Technology.
With Hélia Costa (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment,
London School of Economics)
2.1 Introduction
The question of how  rms respond to environmental policy in terms of investment has
received considerable attention.1 This is of particular interest given the proliferation of
market-based instruments designed to achieve a reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG),
such as emission trading schemes. Currently, the biggest emission trading scheme (ETS)
is the European one, although in 2012 both California and Australia introduced respec-
tively the state GHG cap-and-trade programme, under the Global Warming Assembly
Act, and the carbon price mechanism, in the context of the Clean Energy Future plan.
An emission trading scheme is a cap-and-trade system designed to create incentives for
 rms to invest in low-carbon technology, with the  nal goal of reducing carbon diox-
ide (CO2) emissions. In practice, by allocating a certain amount of tradable emission
permits for each of the energy-intensive installations covered by the scheme, the ETS
places a limit on total CO2 emissions. This system creates a market for these permits
so that, given that  rms have di erent marginal costs of abatement, some installations
 nd it pro table to reduce their emissions and sell the unused allowances. This aggre-
gate limit, or cap, and consequently the allocation of permits per each installation, is
set by a regulatory authority periodically and at a decreasing rate. The periodicity of
the cap decision allows the policy makers to update the limit according to the realized
technology innovation path, to the actual investment process by  rms and to possible
government changes or priority revisions due to business cycles. Although this system
entails a  exibility gain for the authority, it also leads to uncertainty over the future cap
1See, for example, Zhao (2003) and Jung, Krutilla, and Boyd (1996).
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and the future market price of the allowances for the  rms. As a consequence, given the
long-term nature of investments in low-carbon technologies, the return on investment
in abatement is also unknown at the time of investing. Thus, how does uncertainty
over the policy decisions, driven by the periodicity of the cap, a ect  rms’ investment
in low-carbon technologies? More speci cally, is the ETS e cient when  rms do not
know future levels of the cap?
Previous literature has attempted to address similar questions. Blyth, Bradley, Bunn,
Clarke, Wilson, and Yang (2007) study how environmental policy uncertainty a ects
power sector irreversible investment in low carbon technology, following a real option
approach. According to what the theory predicts,2 they  nd that uncertainty over the
price of permits, i.e., the process that drives the future  ow of pro ts, decreases irre-
versible investment. However this analysis presents several limitations. First of all,
policy uncertainty is represented as an exogenous shock over the price of permits. This
setting (an exogenous price and the absence of a policy objective function) rules out any
consideration of the feedback e ect from the  rms to the policy maker, which is impor-
tant from a policy design perspective. Secondly, it concerns only a portfolio choice: that
is, the  rms’ production is held  xed, which eliminates a potential instrument to deal
with future uncertainty. Finally, it focuses only on one of the sectors of the European
scheme (EU ETS), the power sector, and only one possible kind of investment in low-
carbon technology - the irreversible one.
We distinguish between two kinds of investment speci c to the power sector: an ir-
reversible one, which once made is used in production - such as renewable energy re-
sources or energy e ciency - and a reversible one, which may or may not be used in
production depending on ex post pro tability - as is the case of fuel switching.3
Di erentiating between these two options is of vital importance for this research. In
fact, in the analysis by Chen and Tseng (2011), reversible investment is found to in-
crease with uncertainty. The investment studied takes the form of building up a gas
plant, which allows power companies to use gas for production when the price of coal
(the input cost plus the permit price) is higher than the gas price and vice-versa (fuel
2See Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
3According to Shapiro and Varian (1999), a technology investment is comparable to an option when
switching costs are high and therefore a technology lock-in e ect comes into play. We extend this
de nition to the case where switching costs are not extremely high but  rms simply do not  nd it
pro table to switch back to previous technology solution after having invested in new one.
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switching). This investment provides electricity generators with a precautionary instru-
ment that helps to hedge the fuel price risk. However, the same criticisms made of Blyth,
Bradley, Bunn, Clarke, Wilson, and Yang (2007) can be directed at this contribution.
Finally, Colla, Germain, and Van Steenberghe (2012) take a step further in modeling
this market, by introducing an objective function for the authority and endogenizing
the price of the permits. They study the optimal environmental policy for the EU ETS
in the presence of speculators in the market for allowances. However, in their setting,
 rms are homogeneous, with only the choice of irreversible investment, and uncertainty
regards future demand for the  rms’ product, and not the policy rule.
As in previous literature, we consider the current set up of the EU ETS as representative
of a general scheme, although our results carry over to other cap-and-trade systems,
such as the newborn California programme.4 In fact, these two schemes share not only
a comparable design of the cap, but also the type of sectors regulated.
We put forward a stylized but comprehensive setting where the two sectors regulated
by the EU ETS, industry and electricity, have access to di erent low-carbon technolo-
gies. Industries have access only to an irreversible clean technology: energy e ciency
and renewable energy sources. Conversely, power companies may use both irreversible
clean technology and reversible technology, namely fuel switching: electricity genera-
tion  rms can construct a gas plant, while keeping the option of producing with existing
coal plant.5 We explore the  nal e ect of the interaction of these  rms in the market in
terms of aggregate investment. For this purpose, we develop a three-period sequential
model. In the  rst period, two  rms, price takers in the market for emission permits and
representative of the two sectors, decide whether to invest inCO2 abating technologies;
in the second period, uncertainty over the relative preference of the authority over eco-
nomic activity versus environmental concerns is realized and the regulator chooses the
aggregate cap. Finally,  rms decide on their production levels and fuel choices; and the
permits market clears.
To the best of our knowledge, no other model has put together both carbon-intensive
industries and electricity generators, which is essential to capture the  nal behavior of
4Appendix A provides a description of the EU ETS to the extent relevant for the purpose of this analysis
and explains the concept of policy uncertainty in this context. For further information regarding the
EU ETS see Ellerman, Convery, Perthuis, and Alberola (2010) and Chevallier (2011).
5We exclude the reversible technology possibility for the industry sector as it is not a feasible option for
industrial production.
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the aggregate level of investment - both reversible and irreversible - in low-carbon tech-
nology. We also allow for output e ects in addition to substitution e ects, by allowing
 rms to decide on production levels. Additionally, we clearly identify the uncertainty
parameter in the regulator’s objective function as the relative weight the authority puts
on environmental concerns. This provides us with a feedback e ect, since the regula-
tor internalizes the e ect of her choices on  rms’ fuel choices. Moreover, the political
nature of uncertainty allows us to derive important policy implications regarding com-
mitment incentives by policy makers. This is because this type of uncertainty can be
directly in uenced by the authority, as opposed, for instance, to demand uncertainty. Fi-
nally, our formulation allows us to derive a closed form solution and therefore to clearly
identify the e ects of the di erent forces that play a role in this complex picture. Our
model can thus be used as a benchmark to further include additional features of interest
of the di erent ETS and study how the outcome varies with them.
Our results show that, given a balanced proportion of the two regulated sectors, the ef-
fect of policy uncertainty depends on the nature of the investment and the relative pref-
erences of the government. First, as in the real options approach, uncertainty decreases
aggregate irreversible investment. Second, the e ect of uncertainty on reversible tech-
nology varies according to the weight put by the regulating authority on the environ-
ment versus the economy. When policy makers are strongly biased towards economic
activity uncertainty might increase investment in reversible technology, since it creates
an option value for investing:  rms use the investment to hedge against the uncertain
prices in the permit market. However, this positive e ect is partially nulli ed by the in-
terplay with the irreversible technology. Finally, contrary to previous literature, when
policy makers are more environmentally concerned, uncertainty reduces reversible in-
vestment. This is because in some cases it is more pro table for  rms to face uncertainty
by adjusting their output ex post.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model while section 3
presents the methodology and the results. In Section 4 the welfare analysis is presented
and,  nally, Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
We develop a model of three sequential periods, which encompasses the key elements
of a cap-and-trade system. As in the actual market for permits,  rms have to decide on
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their investment strategy before knowing with certainty the future amount of permits
they will be entitled to. Once the cap is set and  rms decide on their production levels,
the price is endogenously determined by the interplay of  rms’ supply and demand of
allowances. We abstract both from temporal trading and speculation, which allows us
to focus on the direct market interactions between the  rms and the regulator. For the
same reason, we do not include demand side e ects, by assuming that  rms can always
sell their production at a constant price. The model considers three di erent agents:
a regulatory authority, or policy maker, and one  rm from each of the two regulated
sectors. Firm 1 is representative of the power sector and  rm 2 of the industrial sector.
Given the large number of installations covered by this type of schemes (the EU ETS
covers around 11 300 energy-intensive installations from 30 countries), and the fact that
the allowances are traded on electronic platforms, it is di cult for any particular  rm to
exert signi cant market power in the market for permits. Therefore, we assume perfect
competition amongst  rms in this market.6 Furthermore, we assume a continuum of
homogeneous  rms within each sector and therefore consider only a representative
 rm from each. This implies, in particular, that the price that prevails in the market will
be determined, in our model, as the result of the interaction of the two  rms, because it
represents the actions taken by the entire market. Finally, all agents are risk neutral.
2.2.1 The regulator
As laid out in the introduction, we focus on the e ect of having uncertainty over the
policy maker’s preferences. Although a long term target for the cap is set out in advance,
the policy maker decides period by period on the actual limit in e ect for that given trad-
ing period (phase), which might be tighter or looser than the average, according to the
importance she puts in environmental concerns versus economic outcomes. This di er-
ence in preferences might derive from priority revisions resulting from business cycles,7
unexpected changes in the technological innovation path, di erent political preferences
of changing governments, or even the presence and in uence of political lobbies. Con-
sidering that a standard payo  period for a low-carbon investment is between 15 and
6This is true even though allowances are not distributed equally amongst  rms: in the EU ETS, power
companies receive a much higher share of allowances. However, the model can be extended to include
some market power amongst the  rms in the electricity generating sector.
7In particular, whenever there is an economic recession, the government in power might choose to
loosen the cap, so as to bolster the economy.
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20 years, when  rms make their investment decisions, their payo  is uncertain - par-
ticularly, investment in low-carbon technology is more pro table if the forthcoming
emission cap is tighter, and vice-versa.
An example of policy uncertainty in the context of the EU ETS is presented in Fig.2.1.
It depicts the information available to the  rms in 2003 and the realized cap for the
Figure 2.1: Annual aggregate cap as known in 2003. Source: European Commission.
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 rst and the second trading periods. In fact, in 2003  rms were aware of the aggre-
gate cap level for the  rst trading period (2005-2007) and they had expectations on the
second phase cap (the dashed line). In 2007 the European Commission announced a
second-phase cap signi cantly lower than the expected one due to the unforeseen over-
allocation of the  rst phase. The di erence between the expected cap for 2008-2012
(dashed line) and the realized one (the solid line) proves evidence of the uncertainty
around the future policy, namely the aggregate cap. A similar description for the other
EU ETS periods can be found in Appendix 1.
We model this uncertainty through a parameter,  ˜, measuring the weight put by the
policy maker on economic expansion, proxied by the  rms’ pro ts, while (1-  ˜) is the
weight put on the disutility from CO2 emissions. This preference parameter can take
52
Chapter 2. Policy Uncertainty and Investment in Low-Carbon Technology.
two values:
 ˜ =
8<: + ⌧ with probability q - ⌧ with probability (1- q)
It can be high with probability q, or low with probability (1-q). Firms know the value
of q,   and ⌧, but they do not know the exact realization of  ˜ a priori, namely when they
make their investment decisions. This value becomes known to  rms only in the second
period, when uncertainty is realized. The regulator sets the cap so as to maximize the
following objective function:
R(e¯;  ˜) =  ˜
"
2X
i=1
⇡i,s
#
- (1-  ˜) e¯ (2.1)
s = h, l; i = 1, 2
where ⇡i,s is the pro t in state s of  rms 1 (power sector) and 2 (industry) and  e is
the damage function that represents the disutility from CO2 emissions, as described
in Scott (1994) and Germain, Steenberghe, and Magnus (2004). This function consists
of a parameter,  , which quanti es not only the marginal immediate damage of CO2
emissions, but also comprises a measure of their long-run social and economic cost, due
to climate change,8 and e, the cap set by the policy maker, which therefore corresponds
to the total amount of CO2 emitted by  rms. We assume that the damage is linear in
the emissions, so that the parameter represents their actual marginal cost.9 In princi-
ple, tightening the cap has two e ects: a substitution e ect, as  rms substitute from
the carbon-intensive input towards cleaner technologies, and an output e ect, because
 rms might  nd it pro table to decrease their production in order to decrease emissions.
2.2.2 The  rms
The representative  rms di er in their productivity, ↵i, their available choice of fuels,
and their cost of investment in clean technologies, measured by ki.10 In particular, the
8Such as the damage from the intensi cation of natural disasters, the decrease in clean water resources,
or migration and restructuring due to the sea level rise.
9A linear damage function has been used in similar analyses (see, for example, Scott1994325
and ECCA:ECCA866).
10For now, we assume throughout that both sectors have the same size. However, the model can easily
be extended to include di erent shares among sectors.
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 rm in the electricity sector may choose to invest in two types of low-carbon technolo-
gies:
• An irreversible clean technology (such as renewable energy sources, RES, or en-
ergy e ciency enhancing technologies) which we consider irreversible, since af-
ter investment takes place the  rm is locked-in to its use.11
• A reversible technology, namely fuel switching in production, which requires
building a second plant that produces using gas,12 and paying a  xed cost, F.
However, once the investment is made and uncertainty over the cap is resolved,
the  rm has the opportunity to switch back to the coal-using plant, if the realized
cap was higher than the expected, given that operating costs of coal are always
lower than those of gas. We assume the  rm operates with only one of the plants
at a time.13 Accordingly, we consider the availability to switch between fuels a
reversible technology. The investment decision is of a discrete nature: to build
or not the new gas plant. We consider this option a low-carbon technology be-
cause gas releases only around 80% of the amount of CO2 emitted by coal. This
coupled with the fact that lower amounts of fuel are necessary, since the produc-
tivity of gas is usually much higher, leads to a much lower total level of emissions
from production. The relevance of gas as energy source for power companies is
illustrated in the table in Appendix B.
On the contrary,  rm 2 has only the option to invest in the irreversible clean technol-
ogy.14 Both clean technologies are continuous variables.
The  rms’ pro t functions can be described as:
⇡1(a1, e1, G1; e¯) = max{⇡1,e(a1, e1; e¯),⇡1,G(a1, G1; e¯)} (2.2)
11Regarding RES, since there are nearly no operating costs, once these investments take place, the  rm
always uses them.
12Almost all the existing coal plants burn pulverized coal in a boiler to generate steam which then drives
a steam turbine. Replacing the existent coal-burners to burn gas would reduce consistently the ef-
 ciency of the gas plant. For instance, a retro t gas plant would have an average of 37% e ciency
whereas a new CCGT has on average 58% e ciency. Therefore almost all the companies build a new
gas plant.
13That is, we assume that both plants are big enough so that the company operates with only one of
them at a time according to the merit order.
14For example, a cooling system installed in a cement installation.
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⇡1,e(a1, e1; e¯) = ↵1,e(a1 + a¯)e1 - ce21 - ps
✓
e1 -
e¯
2
◆
- k1a
2
1 (2.3)
⇡1,G(a1, G1; e¯) = ↵1,G(a1 + a¯)G1 - gG21 - ps
✓
 G1 -
e¯
2
◆
- k1a
2
1 - F (2.4)
for  rm 1, where the pro t will be the maximum between the pro t using coal for
production and the pro t using gas for production, and
⇡2,e(a2, e2; e¯) = ↵2,e(a2 + a¯)e2 - ce22 - ps
✓
e2 -
e¯
2
◆
- k2a
2
2 (2.5)
for  rm 2. Each  rm has a two-input production function, where one of them is a
fossil fuel - coal (e2), for  rm 2, and coal (e1) or gas (G1) for  rm 1 - and the other
is clean technology - a2 for  rm 2 and a1 for  rm 1. Our measure of coal has a one
to one correspondence with carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. We assume that fossil
fuels and clean technology are complementary inputs and for mathematical tractability
we consider a multiplicative production function. This complementarity is justi ed by
technological considerations.15 Given that the pro t is expressed in monetary terms,
these functions imply that the  rms’ pro ts are given by the revenues from their sales,
minus the costs of using gas or coal, which consist of the operating costs of the inputs
plus the permits trading cost, and minus investment costs. The productivity of the
combination of the inputs, which includes the price of the output, is given by ↵i. Due
to their physical properties ↵1,G > ↵1,e. Moreover, a¯ represents the existing level of
clean technologies for the two sectors. This formulation allows  rms to set the level
of investment in clean technology to zero, if optimal, still having a positive production
level. We assume the same a for both sectors.
We assume convex costs of coal and gas, which assures that the pro t functions are
concave in the production inputs. This is satis ed as long as 4cki - ↵2i,e > 0, i = 1, 2
(See Condition 1, Section 2.3.1). The cost structure captures not only the price of the
fuels, but also the storage costs of these inputs, as well as their opportunity cost - both
of which increase exponentially for high quantities of fuels. Because the price of gas is
historically higher on average than the price of coal, we also consider g > c.
The second part of the pro t concerns the permit trading part which is the net demand
15Renewables are intermittent energy resources and very di cult or costly to store, hence the aggregate
supply of electricity always uses a mix of fossil fuels and RES. EF, on the other hand, are investments
that make these fuels more productive, by reducing the energy wasted during the cycle, and must,
therefore, always be used along with the latter.
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for permits ((e- e/2) or ( G- e/2)) multiplied by the endogenous permit price (ps =
p(es)), which is a function of the total amount of allowances (es). The cap is assumed
to be shared equally amongst the  rms,16 and   is the proportion of CO2 emitted by
one unit of gas, as compared to that of one unit of coal. If the net demand is positive,
the  rm is emitting more than what it is entitled to, and therefore is a net buyer of
allowances. On the contrary, if a  rm manages to decrease its emission level below its
allocation of permits, then it is a net seller in the market for allowances.
Finally, kia2i is the cost of investing in the irreversible technology. We assume, as it is
standard in the literature,17 that the cost of investing in this technology is convex.
2.2.3 Timing
The agents’ actions take place as follows: in the  rst period, the two  rms make their in-
vestment decisions, according to their expectation of the forthcoming cap; in the second
period uncertainty is realized and the policy maker decides on the aggregate amount of
permits, by maximizing her objective function; and in the last period,  rms set their
production levels, so as to maximize pro ts, by adjusting their fuel choices. They trade
permits and the market clears, giving rise to the equilibrium price of allowances. This
timeline is set out in Fig.2.2.
2.3 Methodology and Results
In order to better isolate the mechanisms in e ect, we  rst explore two reduced settings:
one where only the irreversible investment (the choice of ai) is available, which means
that  rms can improve their energy e ciency or invest in RES, and the alternative
situation where only reversible investment for the electricity sector - investment in a
gas plant - can be made.
16The ex-ante allocation does not a ect e ciency, as the permit trading reallocates them e ciently; what
matters is the aggregate level.
17After the seminal contribution of Montgomery (1972), several papers have assumed convex abatement
costs - for example, Fell and Morgenstern (2009).
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Figure 2.2: Timeline
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2.3.1 Irreversible Investment in Isolation
We start with the  rst case. When only irreversible investment is available, the  rms’
pro t functions reduce to:
⇡i,e,s(e, a; e¯s) = ↵i,e(ai + a¯)ei,s - ce2i,s - ps
✓
ei -
e¯s
2
◆
- kia
2
i (2.6)
i = 1, 2; s = h, l
where s stands for the realization of the state, which can be high ( ˜h =   + ⌧) or low
( ˜l =  - ⌧). In this reduced setting  rms di er only on their productivity, ↵i and their
cost of abatement parameter, ki.
We solve the model by backward induction.18 In t = 3, after the cap has been set
and uncertainty is revealed, the  rms decide on their output levels by adjusting their
fuel (which consists here of coal, ei), according to the observed cap. They do so by
maximizing their last period pro t, given by (6) net of sunk costs, with respect to the
coal level, taking the price, the allocation and their  rst period choices as given. The
resulting optimal level of coal is, then, given by:
e⇤i,s(ps) =
-ps + ↵i(ai + a¯)
2c
(2.7)
for i = 1, 2; s = h, l, where the star indicates an equilibrium level and ps = p(e¯s).
This optimal quantity depends positively on the productivity parameter ↵i,e, on the in-
vestment in clean technology ai, and on its starting level a¯. This happens because the
18As  rms do not act strategically, the model could also be solved by forward induction.
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marginal productivity of ei is given by ↵i,e(ai+ a¯), which makes the complementarity
e ect between inputs to be larger than the substitution e ect.19 Lastly, the optimal coal
level depends negatively on the price for permits, ps, and on the parameter measuring
operating costs, c.
The two  rms then exchange permits, according to their production needs, and the mar-
ket clears. The equilibrium price is given by the following market clearing condition,
for each of the two s states:
e⇤1,s(ps) + e
⇤
2,s(ps) = e¯s (2.8)
which, solving for ps, gives us the price that clears the market:
p⇤s =
1
2
[↵1(a1 + a¯) + ↵2(a2 + a¯)- 2ce¯s] (2.9)
This price depends negatively on e¯s and c, and positively on the average productivity of
coal. Intuitively, exogenous increases in the productivity of coal make it more pro table
and so boost the demand for permits, thereby increasing its price. On the contrary,
a decrease in operational costs c diminishes coal demand and consequently reduces
the allowances’ price. Finally, increases in the total amount of available permits e¯s
reduce their price, and vice-versa. This negative relation between e¯s and p⇤s means, in
particular, that the price level associated with  ˜h, ph, will be lower (or equal) than that
associated with  ˜l, pl.
Next, we study the policy maker’s behavior. In t = 2, she chooses the cap bymaximizing
her objective function, according to her type s, taking into account her e ect on the
 rms’ last period choices. Her objective function is given by:
Rs(e¯s) =  ˜s
"
2X
i=1
⇡i,s(ai, e
⇤
i ; e¯s)
#
- (1-  ˜s) es (2.10)
s = h, l
where  rms’ pro ts are given by (6), substituting in the equilibrium values e⇤i,s.
The resulting equilibrium cap is a function only of the parameters describing the econ-
omy and ai:
e¯⇤s =
(a1 + a¯)↵1 ˜s + (a2 + a¯)↵2 ˜s + 2 ( ˜s - 1)
2c ˜s
, s = h, l (2.11)
19This is true for any other choice of production function which embodies any (even very small) degree
of complementarity between inputs.
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The optimal cap e¯⇤s depends positively on the weight the regulator puts on the economy,
 ˜s, and negatively on the marginal damage of emissions,  , since  ˜s - 1 > 0. Re-
arranging the expression, it can be seen that the existence of a positive cap is guaranteed
by the following maximum for the marginal damage parameter:
  <
 
(1-  )
1
2
[↵1(a1 + a¯) + ↵2(a2 + a¯)] (2.12)
which means the marginal damage has to be smaller than the average coal productivity
in the market weighted by the relative preference of the regulator for the economy. As
in Colla, Germain, and Van Steenberghe (2012), if the marginal damage of emissions is
too large, the regulator is better o  setting the cap to zero and having no production
(and zero emissions). Therefore, for the rest of the analysis, we assume that   is smaller
than the threshold, and incorporate this condition in the following maximizations.
Finally, we study  rms’ investment decision in the  rst period. In t = 1,  rms face
uncertainty regarding the policy maker’s preference parameter  ˜, and therefore regard-
ing the cap and the market price for permits. They expect, with probability q, that the
regulator is of a high type (i.e., more concerned about the economy), and therefore sets
the associated cap, e¯h, and with probability (1-q) that she is of a low type (more envi-
ronmentally biased), and thus sets the associated cap, e¯l.20 Therefore, they choose their
investment levels by maximizing the following expected pro t function with respect to
ai:
E(⇡i,e(ai; e¯)| , ⌧, q) = q[↵i,e(ai + a¯)e⇤i,h - ce
⇤2
i,h - p(e¯h)(e
⇤
i,h -
e¯h
2
)- kia
2
i t]
(2.13)
+(1- q)[↵i,e(ai + a¯)e
⇤
i,l - ce
⇤2
i,l - p(e¯l)((e
⇤
i,l -
el
2
)- kia
2
i ]
i = 1, 2
In doing so, for each of the two states they take into account the last period optimal
levels of coal, the prices and the caps. Solving the  rst order conditions for ai, we get
the optimum investment level in clean technology, as a function of the expected price:
a⇤i (ph, pl) =
↵1[a¯↵1 - qph - (1- q)pl]
4ck1 - ↵21
20Although  rms act as price takers and do not take into account their own e ect on the price or the cap,
they can assess exactly how these depend on the policy maker’s preferences. So, they associate with
each state s a certain level of permits, e¯s, and price p(e¯s).
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Substituting in the equilibrium price we have:
a⇤i =
(↵i,e(-↵2j,e ˆ¯e+ 2kj[a(↵i,e - ↵j,e) + 2c ˆ¯e]))
16ckikj - 2
 
kj↵2i,e + ki↵
2
j,e
  (2.14)
for i = 1, 2, j = 3- i, where ˆ¯e = [qe¯h + (1- q)e¯l]. This quantity is always positive as
long as the following two conditions are maintained:
4cki - ↵
2
i,e > 0, i = 1, 2 (2.15)
[qeh + (1- q)el] >
-2kja¯(↵i - ↵j)
(4ck2 - ↵2j )
(2.16)
for i = 1, 2, j = 3 - i. The  rst condition regards the comparison between marginal
costs and marginal productivity of ai and ei. The second one means that for a⇤i to be
non-negative the expected cap cannot be too tight. This is because under such a cap
level  rms are better o  setting ei to zero, and consequently not producing. As long as
these conditions are maintained, existence and uniqueness of a⇤i and e
⇤
i are guaranteed.
The derivative of a⇤i with respect to the expected cap, [qeh + (1- q)el], is always pos-
itive under the  rst condition. This e ect takes place due to the complementarity with
ei, and means that also a⇤i depends negatively on the price of ei,s. However, these ef-
fects are larger for e⇤i,s than for a
⇤
i , so that the clean technology to coal ratio actually
increases with increases in the price.21 Additionally, a⇤i depends negatively on ki, so
that the  rm with lower costs of abatement invests more in equilibrium, and vice-versa.
Substituting the equilibrium cap in the optimal levels of inputs and vice-versa, we  nd
that both inputs increase with an increase in  ˜s and decrease with increases in , which
carries over from their e ect on the cap. The same substitution in conditions (12) and
(16) shows (12) is always more binding, so that we take only this one. Thus, the condi-
tions guaranteeing existence and uniqueness of non-negative equilibrium quantities are
the following:
Condition 1
4cki - ↵
2
i,e > 0, i = 1, 2
Condition 2
  6 a¯↵( 
2 - ⌧2)
 - ⌧(1- 2q)- ( 2 - ⌧2)
21Similar to the workings of the capital to labor ratio in most production functions.
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where ↵ = min{↵1,↵2}.
We  nally investigate the e ect of uncertainty on investment in clean technology. We
do so by studying the e ect of an increase in the spread of  ˜s, which essentially means
an increase in ⌧. We  rst assume that uncertainty parameter follows a mean preserving
spread (MPS) process, so that each of the possible states occurs with the same proba-
bility (i.e., q = 1
2
). Comparing the optimal values of ai in the case of full information
(⌧ = 0) with those of uncertainty (⌧ 6= 0), we  nd the that both at an aggregate level
(A =
P2
i=1 ai) and at installation levels investment is always lower in the latter case.
Additionally, we  nd that @a
⇤
i
@⌧
< 0, so that the investment levels monotonically decrease
with uncertainty. This result is perfectly in line with the predictions of the Real Option
Theory and derives from the fact that a higher level of irreversible investment implies
less  exibility to deal with future uncertainty. Lastly, we consider a non-MPS, and  nd
that, whenever q < 1
2
the results are maintained, and for q > 1
2
, they only change
whenever ⌧ > ⌧ˆ =  (2q- 1). This means that increases in ⌧ only have a positive e ect
on irreversible investment for the particular case where the probability that the realiza-
tion is  ˜h = (  + ⌧) is very high, so that increases in ⌧ mean increases in the average
cap. Increasing uncertainty in this case would simply increase the expected cap because
the probability of a high realization is so large. Our results so far are summarized in the
following propositions.
Proposition 1 If the stochastic process follows a mean-preserving spread, irreversible
investment is always lower under uncertainty than with full information, both at an aggre-
gate level and at an installation level. Moreover, the higher the uncertainty, the lower the
the investment.
Proposition 2 If the stochastic process does not follow a mean-preserving spread, and
q < 1
2
the results are maintained. If q > 1
2
, irreversible investment is lower in than in the
certainty case if and only if ⌧ > ⌧ˆ.
2.3.2 Reversible Investment in Isolation
In the second scenario we explore,  rms do not have the option of investing in the irre-
versible technology, but the electricity generating company may take advantage of fuel
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switching. In this case,  rm 1 and  rm 2’s pro t functions are given by equations (2.2)
to (2.5) setting ai to zero.22 The pro ts when using coal and gas for production are,
respectively, given by:
⇡i,e(ei; e¯) = ↵i,eei - ce2i - p(e¯)
✓
ei -
e
2
◆
, i = 1, 2 (2.17)
⇡1,G(G1; e¯) = ↵1,GG1 - gG21 - p(e¯)
✓
 G1 -
e¯
2
◆
- F (2.18)
Since this problem involves not only continuous decisions (the optimal levels of ei and
G1), but also discrete choices by  rm 1 (whether to invest in the gas plant in t = 1 and
which plant to use in t = 3) we follow a somewhat di erent methodology for solving
it.
To begin with, we distinguish the possible behavior of the electricity company, with
respect to its discrete choices. While with full information (i.e. price and cap known
in t = 1) the power company invests in the new plant only if in the last period it
is pro table to use gas instead of coal, under uncertainty this condition is maintained
only under certain values of the fundamentals (⌧,   and  ). For other values, however,
the company might not  nd it pro table to use gas, after having invested, depending
of the realization of  ˜. In the latter case, if the regulator is more biased towards the
environment ( ˜ =  ˜l), the cap is tighter, the permits’ price is higher and, for given fuel
prices, it is more pro table for the  rm to produce by using gas, which requires it to hold
a lower quantity of permits.23 On the contrary, if the regulator is more willing to boost
the economic activity  ˜ =  ˜h, the cap is higher, the allowances’ price is lower, and the
 rm prefers to use the option to switch back to coal, given that c < g. Consequently, we
distinguish between three possible cases, which correspond to the two discrete decisions
of  rm 1:
• Case 1 (NI): Firm 1 does not invest;
• Case 2 (INS): Firm 1 invests and never switches;
22Since a¯ is  xed, it becomes just an increase in productivity. So, we can set it to 1 without loss of
generality, leaving the  rms with a one-input production function.
23Recall from Section II that gas emits less CO2 than coal and it is also more productive.
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• Case 3 (IS): Firm 1 invests and8<:switches if  ˜ =  ˜hdoes not switch if  ˜ =  ˜l
Note what di erentiates the last two cases are the fundamentals, namely the values of
 ,⌧ and q, which are known by all agents from the  rst period, while what matters for
the switching decision of the  rm in the third case is particular realization of  ˜. We start
by studying the two investment conditions: one assuming the fundamentals are such
that  rm 1 never switches after having invested - and so we compare  rm 1’s pro t in
the  rst two cases (INS versus NI); and another assuming that  rm 1 might switch after
the investment - for which we perform the comparison between  rm 1’s pro t in third
and  rst cases (IS versus NI).
The most interesting case, however, is the latter, since it involves the situation where
the  rm switches and takes advantage of the reversibility of the technology. Thus, we
assume the conditions are such that if the  rm invests, it will switch to coal when
 ˜ =   + ⌧, and solve the model for this case. In order to  nd an equilibrium, we  rst
assume it is not optimal for the  rm to invest, and calculate the optimal quantities in a
similar fashion to the case of only irreversible technology. The policy maker’s cap is,
thus, her best response to the quantities in the case where the  rm is not investing in
the gas plant, according to her type (h or l). We then assume it is optimal to invest and
repeat the procedure.24 All the equilibrium quantities, e⇤i,s, e¯
⇤
s and p
⇤
s, for each of the
two cases (NI and IS), have the same properties as the ones derived above, and G⇤1,s is
analogous to the optimal level of coal. Additionally, we  nd that in equilibrium,  rm 2’s
choices of e⇤2,s are equal for both the NI and IS cases. The resulting expected pro ts for
 rm 1 are, therefore,
E[⇡1,NI(e
⇤
s; e¯
⇤
s,NI)] = q[↵1,ee
⇤
h - ce
⇤2
h - p
⇤
h,NI(e
⇤
h -
e¯⇤h,NI
2
)]
+ (1- q)[↵1,ee
⇤
l - ce
⇤2
l - p
⇤
l,NI(e
⇤
l -
e¯⇤l,NI
2
)] (2.19)
24Notice that the cap set by the regulator in equilibrium is di erent depending on whether the  rm
invested or not. Due to market interactions, the optimal level of coal resulting from  rm 2’s pro t
maximization in this case might also be di erent from that of the case where  rm 1 does not invest.
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E[⇡1,IS(e
⇤
h, G
⇤
l ; e¯
⇤
s,IS)] = q[↵1,ee
⇤
h - ce
⇤2
h - p
⇤
h,SI(e
⇤
h -
e¯⇤h,SI
2
)]
+ (1- q)[↵1,GG
⇤
l - gG
⇤2
l - p
⇤
l,SI( G
⇤
l -
e¯⇤l,SI
2
)] (2.20)
for s = h, l.25
In order to explore the  rm’s investment decision, we need to compare the two expected
pro ts. However, since the  rm is a price taker, it does not take into account its own
e ect on the price and the cap. Therefore, when the company makes its investment
decision it does not compare the two expected pro ts described above directly.
Our equilibrium is, therefore, constructed in the following manner. We  rst assume it
is an equilibrium for the representative  rm to invest. This means all the continuum of
 rms invest, so that the equilibrium cap and price are e¯⇤s,IS and p
⇤
s,IS. Then, we check
if this is the case; that is, if there does not exist any pro table deviation. We do so by
comparing the pro t of the representative  rm when investing (and switching) with
that of not investing, when the cap and the price are those prevailing assuming the  rm
is investing:
E[⇡1,IS(e
⇤
h, G
⇤
l ; e¯
⇤
s,IS, p
⇤
s,IS)]- E[⇡1,NI(e
⇤
h, e
⇤
l ; e¯
⇤
s,IS, p
⇤
s,IS)] > 0, s = h, l (2.21)
We then repeat the procedure assuming it is an equilibrium not to invest, and compare:
E[⇡1,NI(e
⇤
h, e
⇤
l ; e¯
⇤
s,NI, p
⇤
s,NI)]- E[⇡1,IS(e
⇤
h, G
⇤
l ; e¯
⇤
s,NI, p
⇤
s,NI)] > 0, s = h, l (2.22)
Considering, once again, a MPS we  nd that there is a threshold on F, Fth, such that, for
F < Fth  rm 1 is better o  investing, both when the cap is e¯⇤s,IS and e¯
⇤
s,NI, and prices
are p⇤s,IS and p
⇤
s,NI. The opposite is true when F > F
th.26
We therefore  nd a unique equilibrium, given the fundamentals of the economy, con-
sisting of the equilibrium quantities above, the system of beliefs of  rms, given by q, the
threshold for investment and the condition for switching, determined further below.
Finally, for easiness of interpretation, we analyze the equilibrium imposing restrictions
on some of the parameters that are not central to our analysis. The calibration proce-
dure is described in Appendix C. With these values, we plot equations (2.21) and (2.22).
In Fig.2.3 we present the graph for the particular case of   = 0.5 and   = 280, which
in our framework describe a policy maker with balanced preferences. The  gure shows
25The expected pro t for  rm 2 is analogous to the previous case.
26We assume that, when indi erent, i.e., F = Fth, the  rm invests.
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Figure 2.3: Investment decision for  rm 1
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that, for F < Fth, the  rm has a higher pro t when investing in the gas plant, both
when the cap is set optimally for this choice (positive part of the curve representing
(21)) and when the cap is set optimally for NI (negative part of curve (22)). For F > Fth
the  rm no longer has an incentive to invest: equation (2.21) becomes negative, and
(2.22) positive, meaning that for any of the two caps, the  rm is better o  not investing.
The same procedure was followed to  nd an equilibrium in the case where the  rm
never switches to coal, once it has invested (INS). We  nd that the threshold for invest-
ing is larger since the company is willing to pay more for an investment that it is sure
it will use. In a similar graph to that of Fig.2.3, this corresponds to a jump of the two
curves to the right.
To complete the analysis for the reversible technology case, we  nd the conditions un-
der which the  rm switches. We proceed in the same manner as before, by assuming an
equilibrium in the last period, and then checking for pro table deviations. Additionally,
and since the regulator can in uence the  rm’s decision to switch because the cap is set
before this, we compare her utility under each of the cases, to  nd unique conditions.
We  nd that the switching decision depends on a the relative environmental preference
of the regulator weighted by the marginal emission damage:
' =
(1-  )
 
  (2.23)
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In particular, we  nd a critical point, 'th, for which the switching decision depends on
⌧. Speci cally:
1. If ' < 'th, 8⌧ whenever  rm 1 invests it switches for a high realization;
2. If ' > 'th, the  rm switches only if ⌧ > ⌧th (i.e., if the spread of the uncertainty
parameter is very high).
The e ect of uncertainty on this reversible investment depends on the region of these
parameters:
• If we are in the  rst case (' < 'th) and the  rm always switches, then increases
in the spread of  ˜s (⌧) increase the threshold for investing, Fth, so that there is
more investment in equilibrium. This e ect can be seen in Fig.2.3 as a movement
of all the curves to the right.
• Whenever ' > 'th, and ⌧ < ⌧th, the  rm does not switch, and, therefore,
investing in the gas plant is equivalent to an irreversible investment.27 Therefore,
the e ect of uncertainty is negative.28
• Finally, in the case where' > 'th and ⌧ > ⌧th, the  rm switches under the high
realization of uncertainty, but increases in ⌧ lead to decreases in investment.
Our results di er from those of Chen and Tseng (2011), where reversible investment
always increases with uncertainty, due to the output e ect: because  rms are able to
adjust their fuel quantities after uncertainty is resolved, they  nd it more pro table to
decrease production than investing in a gas plant, if there is the possibility of a very low
level of the cap, which follows from the existence of an environmentally-biased regula-
tor (' > 'th) and a high level of uncertainty (⌧ > ⌧th).
Proposition 3 If  rms are allowed to vary their output, reversible investment increases
with uncertainty only for some values of the fundamentals of the economy.
27This result is in line with the analysis of Blyth, Bradley, Bunn, Clarke, Wilson, and Yang (2007).
28In the analogous graph to the one in Fig.2.3, but for the comparison between NI and INS, which we do
not present due to space restrictions, the two curves move to the left as ⌧ increases, decreasing the
threshold for investment.
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In a nutshell, if the authority is more biased towards the economy (either because the
marginal damage is high, or   is low), then uncertainty may have a positive e ect on
reversible investment, when it is considered in isolation. On the other hand, when the
policy maker is more environmentally-oriented (either because   is very high, or   is
low), uncertainty is never bene cial for investment.
2.3.3 Complete Environment
We now turn to the complete model, where both reversible and irreversible investments
are available for the power generating  rm, and the latter for the  rm representative of
the industrial sector. The procedure for solving is similar to that of subsection 2.3.2, but
incorporating the  rst period choices of ai, as determined in subsection 2.3.1.
Firms now have di erent optimal decisions on the level of clean technology according
to the discrete reversible investment choice of  rm 1: a⇤j , j = INS, IS,NI. This is be-
cause the power sector company adjusts its level of the irreversible technology, so as to
maximize its pro t, according to the productivity associated to the fuel it expects to use.
Then, due to market interactions that a ect the prevailing cap, we also allow  rm 2 to
decide on diverse levels of investment according to the fuel choices of  rm 1, although
in equilibrium, we  nd that they do not di er. This gives rise, in equilibrium, to three
di erent levels of irreversible investment for  rm 1, one for each of the three cases (NI,
IS, INS) and only one for  rm 2. When comparing these results with those of the model
in subsection 2.3.1, we  nd that a⇤1,INS > a⇤1;IS > a⇤1,NI = a⇤1,isol.29 This means that
the higher the probability of the  rm using gas in production, the higher is the level of
a⇤1.
30
All the comparative statics for the equilibrium levels of the continuous variables above
are maintained. In particular, aggregate investment in the irreversible technology al-
ways decreases with uncertainty.
As for the discrete choice of switching, we follow the procedure described before to  nd
a threshold on (1- )
 
 , call it'th
0
, for which the decision to change fuels once invested
depends on ⌧. Our results con rm that, also in the full setting, when the government is
more biased towards the environment, ' > 'th
0
, the power company switches when-
29The level of a⇤2 remains unchanged.
30This is because, on average, a1 represents an addition to the productivity of the fuel, as the two inputs
are complements.
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ever ⌧ > ⌧th, and uncertainty always decreases investment in the reversible technol-
ogy. However, in the case of a government more incline towards economic activity, i.e.
' < 'th
0
, where  rm 1 decides to switch for any ⌧ > 0 after investing, the results
change when the choice of the irreversible technology is included in the model. The
present scenario is characterized by two features:  rstly, for low levels of uncertainty
the  rm never invests; secondly, the positive e ect of uncertainty on the reversible in-
vestment level, observed in isolation, vanishes for high levels of ⌧. Fig.2.4 depicts the
threshold for investment, Fth, as a function of ⌧ for a given ' < 'th
0
and it allows to
identify these outcomes.31 There are four regions of interest and, consequently, three
Figure 2.4: Investment in Reversible Technology
additional thresholds for ⌧. For low levels of uncertainty, ⌧ < ⌧1, reversible investment
increases with uncertainty as in subsection 2.3.2 but  rms never invest. This is because,
even if F = 0, the  rm always has a lower pro t investing in the gas plant than not
investing. This e ect can be traced to the equilibrium behavior of the regulator: the
introduction of the possibility of ai in the  rms’ production functions allows the policy
maker to lower the cap, since the same level of production can be attained emitting less
CO2. This lower limit on emissions, in turn, decreases both the equilibrium levels of
e1,s and G1,s which, as set out before, decrease the  rm’s expected pro t in di erent
ways. Speci cally, the  rm’s pro t function ⇡1,G is much more responsive to changes
in Gi,s than ⇡1,e is to changes in e1,s, so that @⇡1,G@e¯ >
@⇡1,e
@e¯
. Additionally, this rela-
tionship is not linear in e¯: for higher values of the cap, the variation in pro ts is higher
31We again use the calibration described in Appendix C. We set again   = 0.5 and now   = 150, such
that the constraint on ' is satis ed.
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than for lower ones. Consequently, the introduction of ai leads an economically biased
authority to set a cap for which it is no longer pro table for the  rm to invest in a gas
plant. In the case of the more environmental policy maker described above, however,
this e ect is not enough to eliminate investment, due to the lower expected cap associ-
ated with this regulator type.
The second region refers to ⌧1 < ⌧ < ⌧2, where the power company invests in the re-
versible technology and uncertainty maintains the positive e ect on investment found
in subsection 2.3.2 as it represents a means to insure itself against future potential high
permits price.
When ⌧ > ⌧2, however, uncertainty has a negative e ect over investment in the re-
versible technology. This is derives from the negative impact of uncertainty over the ir-
reversible investment. Since the pro t of the  rm using gas is more sensitive to changes
in the level of the clean technology, aIS, than the the pro t when using coal, it de-
creases faster as aIS diminishes. This e ect now prevails over the hedging motive and
reversible investment decreases with uncertainty. Thus for ⌧2 < ⌧ < ⌧3, the  rm still
invests but the higher the uncertainty the less the investment made is. Additionally, for
⌧ > ⌧3 the  rm does not  nd it pro table to invest, for any  xed cost F. The following
proposition summarizes this result:
Proposition 4 In a comprehensive setting with output variation the introduction of irre-
versible investment decisions partly eliminates the possibility of a positive e ect of uncer-
tainty on reversible investment found for governments biased towards the economy.
We further study the second threshold for ⌧, which is derived as the value for which
@⇡IS
@⌧
= 0, and captures the point where there is a change in the sign of the e ect that
uncertainty has over reversible investment. Fig.2.5 plots this threshold for di erent lev-
els of   and for a given marginal damage   = 50. If ⌧ is below the threshold, namely
within the shaded area, uncertainty leads to a higher investment level. On the contrary,
for ⌧ higher than the threshold uncertainty has a negative e ect on investment. The
triangle delimitates the maximum ⌧ possible for each value of  , so that ⌧ has a positive
e ect on reversible investment only in the shaded area under the triangle. Note that
⌧2 is increasing with  . This means that for policy makers more biased towards the
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Figure 2.5: Threshold for positive e ect
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economy,32, the higher their bias, measured by   for given  , the higher the maximum
level of uncertainty that stimulates investment.
The main results of the complete model can be summarized in Table 1.
Table 2.1: Final e ect of uncertainty on investment
Parameters Preferences Uncertainty Re-
versible
Uncertainty
Irreversible
' > 'th
0
Environment Negative Negative
' < 'th
0
2*Economy Positive if ⌧ < ⌧2 Negative
Negative if ⌧ >
⌧2
Negative
In a setting which mimics the real world interaction in investment decisions, these
results mean that if the authority has clear long run environmental goals such as the
32Recall that we are in the case of ' < 'th
0
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Kyoto Protocol, policy uncertainty is not likely bene cial for any type of investment in
low-carbon technology. On the contrary, for an emerging country clearly prioritizing
economic growth or for a developed one with a strong industrial lobby, such as the
United States of America, some level of uncertainty might stimulate the development
of a low-carbon economy. In fact, this uncertainty will allow for a transition period
through the use of a less carbon-intensive fuel (gas), towards the implementation of
clean technology, such as renewable energy and energy e ciency.
2.4 Welfare Analysis
In the previous sections we focused solely on understanding the channels through
which uncertainty a ects investment in low-carbon technology. We now turn to the
question of how much uncertainty, and therefore investment, is optimal from a welfare
perspective.
Following Colla, Germain, and Van Steenberghe (2012) and Germain, Steenberghe, and
Magnus (2004) in similar analysis, we use the regulator’s objective function as a measure
of aggregate welfare. This means that ex-ante welfare is a weighted average of the prof-
its in the economy and the disutility of the environmental damage from emissions. We
therefore perform a partial welfare analysis that does not consider other uncertainties
that might interact with the optimality of the decision-making process - for example,
policy uncertainty may be bene cial in terms of welfare if it acts as a stabilizer for the
economy, of if the  exibility it entails allows the policymaker to adjust the stringency
cap to the current state of technological process.
As in the investment analysis, our results di er depending on the parameter regions
that de ne the optimal choices of the  rms - that is, on '. Accordingly, expected wel-
fare for an environmentally concerned government, E(Wen), becomes the following
discontinuous function:
E(Wen) =
8>>><>>>:
qR (G⇤1,h, e
⇤
2,h, a
⇤
1, a
⇤
2, e¯
⇤
h,INS) + (1- q)R (G
⇤
1,l, e
⇤
2,l, a
⇤
1, a
⇤
2, e¯
⇤
l,INS) if ⌧ < ⌧
th
qR (e⇤1,h, e
⇤
2,h, a
⇤
1, a
⇤
2, e¯
⇤
h,IS) + (1- q)R (G
⇤
1,l, e
⇤
2,l, a
⇤
1, a
⇤
2, e¯
⇤
l,IS) if ⌧
th < ⌧ < ⌧3
qR (e⇤1,h, e
⇤
2,h, a
⇤
1, a
⇤
2, e¯
⇤
h,IS) + (1- q)R (G
⇤
1,l, e
⇤
2,l, a
⇤
1, a
⇤
2, e¯
⇤
l,IS) if ⌧ > ⌧3
The resulting welfare can be seen in Fig.2.6 using the calibration described in Ap-
pendix C and ' > 'th
0
.
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Figure 2.6: Welfare function: environmentally biased authority.
The welfare function is represented by the solid lines, and the two vertical lines corre-
spond to the ⌧ thresholds for switching and investing. When ⌧ < ⌧th the electricity  rm
chooses to invest in a gas plant and never switches back to coal. Even though the higher
the uncertainty (⌧) the smaller the investment (see Section 2.3.3), welfare is a concave
function of uncertainty. In fact, faced with higher uncertainty,  rms will decrease not
only clean technology investment but also output, and therefore emissions. The conse-
quent positive e ect of lower emissions on welfare more than o sets the losses in terms
of output. When ⌧th < ⌧ < ⌧3, the electricity  rm invests in the reversible technology
but switches to coal whenever there is a high realization of the cap. Here, the previ-
ous e ect is intensi ed because the emission reduction is higher given that coal is more
carbon-intensive than gas. Finally, for ⌧ > ⌧3, the power sector representative  rm is no
longer investing in low-carbon technology, and the decreases in production driven by
very low levels of the clean technology overcome the gains from lower emissions, lead-
ing to a rapidly decreasing welfare. Thus, for environmentally concerned governments,
even though any level of uncertainty decreases all types of investment in low-carbon
technology, expected welfare is maximized for a positive level of ⌧. This partial equi-
librium analysis excludes however any long-run bene ts of boosting investment in the
short-run, both in environmental terms and in terms of technological development.
Finally, when the government is more economically biased the  rms’ optimal decisions
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change and the expected welfare is de ned accordingly:
E(Wec) =
8<:qR (e⇤1,h, e⇤2,h, a⇤1, a⇤2, e¯⇤h,IS) + (1- q)R (G⇤1,l, e⇤2,l, a⇤1, a⇤2, e¯⇤l,IS) if ⌧1 > ⌧ > ⌧3qR (e⇤1,h, e⇤2,h, a⇤1, a⇤2, e¯⇤h,NI) + (1- q)R (e⇤1,l, e⇤2,l, a⇤1, a⇤2, e¯⇤l,NI) otherwise
This is depicted by the solid lines in Fig.2.7, for the same calibration and ' < 'th
0
.
As the  gure shows, also here the expected welfare is maximum for a positive level of
Figure 2.7: Welfare function: economically biased authority.
uncertainty. Only in the extreme case of a very low damage of emissions ( ) welfare
would be higher for the minimum uncertainty - here, low uncertainty and cheaper per-
mits would allow for a high level of output without the cost of reversible investment for
hedging purposes.
2.5 Conclusion
In the context of a carbon dioxide Emission Trading Scheme, we study how uncertainty
over the policy rule, driven by periodicity of the aggregate cap, a ects  rms’ invest-
ment in low-carbon technologies. We formulate a three period sequential model that
puts together the two sectors regulated by the European scheme and encompasses both
irreversible and reversible investment possibilities for the  rms. Additionally, we explic-
itly model the policy uncertainty as the relative priority the regulator puts on economic
activity with respect to environment concerns and we assume that it follows a mean
73
Chapter 2. Policy Uncertainty and Investment in Low-Carbon Technology.
preserving spread process.
The results of previous literature carry over to our enlarged framework as far as irre-
versible investment is concerned. Namely, we  nd uncertainty always reduces invest-
ment levels. Regarding reversible investment taken in isolation, our results di er with
respect to previous literature. Speci cally, allowing  rms to change their production
ex post provides them with an additional instrument to cope with uncertainty (output
e ect), which mitigates to some extent the positive e ect of uncertainty in reversible
investment. Finally, in a complete setup, we show that introducing the additional possi-
bility of irreversible investment partially eliminates the potential positive e ect of policy
uncertainty on reversible technology. The negative e ect of uncertainty on irreversible
investment carries over to the pro tability of the reversible one, so that for higher levels
of uncertainty this e ect becomes negative.
To sum up, we  nd that only when policy makers are concerned primarily with eco-
nomic expansion, relative to environmental issues, a small level of uncertainty might
increase reversible investment, by making it a pro table opportunity. This situation
might take place in developing countries, where often growth concerns relegate en-
vironmental issues to the background. On the contrary, in the case of the European
Union, where we observe a higher environmental awareness, with clear long run green
policy goals, policy uncertainty most likely has a negative e ect on all investment in
low-carbon technology. In this case the introduction of commitment mechanisms that
reduce long-term uncertainty would help to create the right incentives to reach the
CO2 reduction target of the policy. These could consist, for example, of the setting of a
long-term limited range for the cap, which would be enforceable by law, thereby bind-
ing future governments. These mechanisms should however guarantee the minimum
 exibility required to adjust to unforeseen changes of the technological process or to
stabilize economic shocks.
Our analysis abstracts from features of permit markets that might have considerable
impact on our analysis. The  rst is that we assumes a constant demand and prices for
 rms’ output. As input prices increases and demand is constant, prices are likely to
adjust thereby increasing the  rms’ pro tability. If this is the case the e ect of policy
uncertainty might be substantially bu ered. The second is that we do not consider the
possibility of permit banking introduced in the third phase of the EU ETS. Banking en-
dows  rms with another instrument to hedge against uncertainty, thereby constituting
an important substitute to both reversible and irreversible investment. An interesting
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extension to our model would be to analyze the  nal e ect in terms of both investment
and emissions.
Appendix A: The EU ETS and Policy Uncertainty
Launched in 2005, the EU ETS is a market based approach that relies on the companies’
cost di erential of reducing emissions. The current scheme involves two sectors: power
companies and carbon-intensive industries. Industries covered include factories produc-
ing cement, lime, glass, brick, pulp and paper, oil re neries, coke ovens, iron and steel.33
Each of these installations receives annually an allocation of permits which corresponds
to the total amount of CO2 it is entitled to emit during the production processes. At the
end of a speci ed trading round, each participant is required to hold permits represent-
ing its total emissions for the period.34 Companies that exceed their quotas are allowed
to buy unused permits from those that have excess supply, as a result of investment in
abatement or of reduction in their production level. These permits are called European
Union Allowances (EUA) and are traded in a speci c platform, one EUA corresponding
to the right to emit one ton of CO2. Participants who do not meet this requirement are
subject to  nancial penalties.
Until 2008 the authority opted for a grandfathering type of allocation, namely based
on historical emissions levels, but from 2013 the scheme will move towards an alloca-
tion rule based on benchmarking and auctioning.35 The total amount of the allocated
permits constitutes the cap. Both the cap and the allocation are set by the regulatory
authority. Until 2008 the allocation decision was made by national authorities through
the National Allocation Plans, while from 2013 this decision has been centralized at
the European level. The authority decides on the level of the cap period by period but
considering long run targets. These periods are called phases and they di er in length.
Fig.2.8-2.10 depict for each of these phases the information available to  rms regarding
the future aggregate cap. Directive 2003/87/EC set the goal of achieving an 8% reduction
33Petro-chemical and aviation will be part of the scheme in 2012-2013.
34From the second phase of the scheme,  rms are allowed to bank and borrow their permits among di er-
ent periods and phases of the scheme, namely to smooth the usage of their permits inter-temporally.
35This additional feature should not change our results. In fact, assuming that the auction revenues are
redistributed by the authority as lump sum to the same  rms, the regulator’s objective function is not
a ected.
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Figure 2.8: Annual aggregate cap as known in 2003. Source: European Commission.
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in emissions of greenhouse gases by 2008 to 2012 compared to 1990 levels, and estab-
lished a long-run goal of reducing emissions of greenhouse gases by approximately 70%
compared to 1990 levels. The only cap set precisely was that of the  rst phase, 2005-
2007 (Fig.2.8). This means that each regulated  rm had to plan its long term investment,
which has a payback period estimated in around 15 years, without knowing the ag-
gregate cap level, and therefore its allocation of allowances, from 2008 onwards, but
assuming a tighter cap in the future given the long term reduction goal (-70% compared
to 1990 levels). In 2007, the cap for the period 2008-2012 was set to 2177MtCO2, thereby
correcting the previously announced one (dashed line in Fig.2.9). As reported by the EU
Press Release IP/07/1614 of 26/10/2007, the European Commission also made a unilateral
commitment that Europe would cut its emissions by at least 20% of 1990 levels by 2020,
to be implemented "through a package of binding legislation". Although this implies a
higher commitment of authorities towards lower emissions, also in this phase economic
agents were uncertain about the cap level after 2012. Moreover the unexpected revision
dictated by the over-allocation from the  rst phase increased even more the perceived
volatility of the future cap level. Finally, as shown in Fig.2.10, for the period 2013-2020,
the cap corresponds to a trajectory. Speci cally, it "will decrease each year by 1.47% of
the average annual total quantity of allowances issued by the Member States in 2008-
2012", according to directive 2010/634/EU, starting with a cap of 2039MtCO2. However,
after 2020, the cap level is still unclear: it is stated that "this annual reduction will con-
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Figure 2.9: Annual aggregate cap as known in 2007. Source: European Commission.
1900
2000
2100
2200
2300
2400
M
t  o
f  C
O
2
e q
u i
v a
l e
n t
1800
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 .. .. .. .. 2020
Years
Actual aggregate cap (Mt of CO2 equivalent) Phase I
Actual aggregate cap (Mt of CO2 equivalent) Phase II
Proposed annual aggregate cap (Mt of CO2 equivalent) Phase II
Long term target (-20% to 1990)
tinue beyond 2020 but may be subject to revision not later than 2025". As underlined
above, given the long term nature of low-carbon investments (around 15 years), this
uncertainty over the policy instrument, the cap, may a ect aggregate investment.
2.6 Appendix B: Gas transition in the European
power sector
For the choice of reversible investment we used the possibility for electricity generating
 rms to produce with gas or coal, according to which is more pro table. The following
table reports the percentage of coal and gas used in the production mix of the power
sector in di erent European countries in 1990 and 2010, as evidence of the relevance
of gas as a production output. Coal is clearly substituted out, mostly by gas, in all the
countries considered. This is not only a feature of the European Union, but a worldwide
trend of employing gas in the electricity generation process.
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Figure 2.10: Annual aggregate cap as known in 2010. Source: European Commission.
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Percentage of coal and gas in the energy mix (1990-2010)
Coal Gas
1990 2010 1990 2010
Germany 58% 44% 7% 13%
Italy 17% 14% 19% 53%
Spain 40% 11% 1% 32%
United Kingdom 65% 28% 1% 46%
Table 2.2: Coal and gas in the energy mix. Source: Enerdata and IEA.
2.7 Appendix C: Calibration
We present the parameter restrictions used for the interpretation of the results. As
previously pointed out, this calibration exercise is dictated by the complexity of the an-
alytical solutions.
Given the richness of information provided by the UK Government Department of En-
ergy and Climate Change, we take the British market as a benchmark for the calibration
of the parameters that are country dependent.
Productivity. We calibrate three di erent productivity parameters: one for the power
sector when the plant is run by using coal (↵1,e), one when the plant produces by using
gas(↵1,G), and,  nally, one for the industries sector which produces always by using
coal (↵2). We consider the productivity of gas (output per 1000 cubic meters), adjusted
78
Chapter 2. Policy Uncertainty and Investment in Low-Carbon Technology.
for the thermodynamic e ciency of an average gas power plants, to be equal to 11
MWh/dam3 (calori c value=40). For the coal, the adjusted productivity is set at 6.68
MWh/tonne. As mentioned in Section III, these parameters include also the price of
the output. This means, for instance, that to calibrate (↵1,e) we have to multiply the
productivity of a power plant using coal by the retail price of electricity. For the  rst
two parameters, (↵1,e) and (↵1,G), we use the Energy Prices and Taxes Statistics of the
International Energy Agency, and take the annual average UK retail prices excluding
taxes (in pounds per kWh) as a proxy for the price of electricity. Speci cally, the annual
average of UK end-of-use electricity price from 2006 to 2010 is 137 Euro per MWh (ap-
plying the current exchange rate). For the industrial sector we choose four industries
regulated by the ETS: Steel, Cement, Pulp and Aluminium,36 and we construct an indus-
trial sector productivity index. Therefore (↵2)is the de ned as
P4
j=1 pj⌫j, where j is the
industry index, pj is the output price of industry j, and ⌫j is the output per ton of coal
ratio for industry j. Industry data is taken from sector associations while average output
prices are collected from London Metal Exchange. The particular values follow. Cement
UK industry: ⌫ = 0.78, p = 70 Euro/t; Steel UK industry: ⌫ = 1, p = 400 Euro/t;
Aluminium UK industry: ⌫ = 0.7, p = 1800 Euro/t; Pulp EU industry:37 ⌫ = 0.83,
p = 480 Euro/t. Summing up, the three adjusted productivity parameters are the fol-
lowing: ↵1,e = 339.9, ↵2 = 528.25, ↵1,G = 509.6, and they are consistent with the
observed fact that gas is more productive than coal.
Inputs Cost. As mentioned in previous sections, C(e) and C(G) are the operating costs
of the fuels and we assume them to be convex in order to comprise not only the price
of fuels, but also the storage and opportunity costs. As a proxy for c and g, we use
UK government statistics on average prices of fuels purchased by the major UK power
producers:38 c = 62 Euro/t and g = 185.9 Euro/dm3.
Emission Factor.   is the proportion of CO2 emitted by one unit of gas, as compared
to that of one unit of coal. Given that the amount of CO2 generated by one unit coal
equals 2.86 ton and the CO2 emitted by gas is 0.0019 t/m3, after the required measure-
ment transformations, we get that the relative emission produced by one cubic meter of
gas is 0.8.
36The latter will be included in the scheme in 2013.
37Due to absence of pulp production in the UK we use EU data as the ETS is a European Market.
38Given that the average annual prices of coal purchased by the manufacturing industry in the UK is
very close to the cost of coal paid by power producers, we use the same average for both sectors.
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Investment Costs for Irreversible Investment. k2 and k1 represent the cost that indus-
tries incur in to improve their energy e ciency and that power companies have to pay
to invest in renewables, respectively. As evidence suggests that these values di er con-
siderably depending on the technology, we do not assign any value to these parameters
and we let them be restricted only by the conditions indicated in the Section IV.
Finally note that, given the stylized three period nature of the model, most of the model
parameters do not have a direct correspondent to reality, where the time horizon is
more extend and involves several repetitions of investment and production decisions.
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Chapter 3
Does Internationalization Pay O  When
Environmental Policy Tightens?
3.1 Introduction
During the last decades governments have increasingly tightened environmental policy,
using a diversi ed portfolio of instruments. Figure 3.1 reports the evolution of environ-
mental policy stringency (EPS) over time for a sample of 11 OECD countries.1 The
upward trend in EPS comes as a response to the increasing awareness of the environ-
mental and economic damages associated with the current production processes and
increasing demand to tackle these problems.
By a ecting  rms’ investment choices, production and resource allocation, an EPS
tightening is likely to a ect  rms’ economic performance, namely multi-factor produc-
tivity growth ( Albrizio, Ko luk, and Zipperer. (2014)). On the one hand, environmental
policies imply an additional burden for  rms. As  rms devote resources to comply with
the regulation their productivity growth may decrease. A ected  rms might react by
moving part of their polluting activities to countries with lax environmental regulation
(Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH)). On the other hand, environmental policies pro-
vide incentives for e ciency improvements in energy or waste, which in turn could
lead to productivity gains (Porter Hypothesis - Porter (1991); Porter and van der Linde
(1995)). These e ects might be ampli ed by  rms’ international linkages such as inter-
national ownership: multinational  rms may have additional instruments than domes-
tic ones to cope with the costs and incentives associated with a tightening in EPS. Simi-
lar to pro t shifting behaviors associated with tax evasion ( Ma ni and Mokkas (2010),
Johansson, Sorbe, and Skeie (2014)) multinationals may elude domestic environmental
1The EPS index, developed by Botta and Ko luk (2014), is based on the aggregation of quantitative and
qualitative information on environmental policy instruments into one comparable, country-speci c
measure of environmental policy stringency. See the data section for detailed description.
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Figure 3.1: EPS index, country-speci c measure of environmental policy stringency,
Botta and Ko luk (2014)
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regulation. International ownership may facilitate cross-country reallocation processes
allowing multinationals to o shore part of their production to foreign a liates. Ad-
ditionally, multinationals can exploit intra-group R&D and know-how in e cient and
clean technologies, which lowers costs and speeds up technological implementation.2
This paper assesses whether there exists a statistically-signi cant di erence in multi-
factor productivity growth between multinational and domestic  rms when they face
a tightening of environmental policy. This question is of particular relevance for the
design of environmental polices. In fact such heterogeneous e ect on productivity may
pose concerns on the e ectiveness of environmental regulation if multinationals o -
shore the most polluting parts of the production process and elude domestic regulation.
Moreover, by a ecting the country’s productivity growth distribution, environmental
policy stringency may eventually a ect the country’s competitiveness. This paper  nds
that MNEs experience higher productivity growth than domestic  rms when environ-
mental policies tighten. This result is corroborated by using two alternative industry-
level proxies for internationalization: a measure of participation in global value chains
and the foreign intermediates outsourcing index. Production processes are increasingly
2Costs include: information e ort, patents, cost of pilot tests for implementability, etc.
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re-organised within the so-called global value chains (GVCs), where di erent produc-
tion stages are located across di erent countries sometimes regardless of  rms’ own-
ership structure. "In a global value chain, production is subdivided into  ne slices of
specialization along the chain, that leads to trade across international boundaries in or-
der to take advantage of e ciencies in di erent jurisdictions" ( Baldwin and Yan (2014)).
Similarly to international ownership,  rms participating in GVCs may outsource rela-
tively more polluting activities to countries with less stringent environmental regulation
( OECD (2013)). In terms of R&D spillovers and e ciency gains, GVC participation may
also help  rms to capitalize on technology spillovers from other suppliers and custumers
in the chain and to scale up investments in abatement. The foreign intermediates out-
sourcing index captures the foreign intermediate intensity and it is constructed as the
share of imported intermediates in the total intermediates expenditure. As for the other
internationalization measures, a high level of the index would imply higher possibilities
of o shoring polluting intensive activities, reaching comparative cost advantages. The
 ndings from the analysis using the three di erent internationalization indexes (MNE,
GVC and intermediate outsourcing) point in the same direction. They all con rm the
hypothesis that international  rms have additional instruments to cope with EPS and
pave the way for future research to identify the prevailing mechanism: (i) o shoring
parts of production to elude EPS or (ii) investing domestically in energy e ciency in
order to capitalize on technological spillovers and economies of scale.
This paper is structured as follows: Section I provides an overview of the related
literature. Section II describes the data and provides descriptive statistics across groups
(multinationals and domestic  rms). Section III explains the empirical speci cation and
section IV reports the main results. Section V reports robustness checks and tests an
additional hypothesis. Section VI concludes.
3.2 Literature
Two strands of literature look at issues related to the e ect of environmental policies
on productivity and  rms’ choices. However, neither tend to pay much attention to the
heterogeneous e ects across  rms, and none of the papers looks at the e ect of EPS
on productivity conditional on international links. On the one hand,  rm and industry
studies examine the e ect of EPS on productivity growth, but they do not di erentiate
85
Chapter 3. Does Internationalization Pay O When Environmental Policy
Tightens?
 rms according to international ownership. On the other hand, literature distinguish-
ing between international and domestic dimensions have mainly focused on testing the
Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH).
Early studies on  rm or plant level MFP growth show a negative but not robust ef-
fect of environmental regulation on productivity growth. Most of the studies compare
productivity growth between regulated and non-regulated  rms or plants,  nding neg-
ative ( Gollop and Roberts (1983), Smith and Sims (1985)) or insigni cant ( Berman
and Bui (2001)) results. One of the shortcomings of these studies is the lack of  rm or
plant speci c controls in the analysis. Becker (2010) and Gray (1987) show that  rms’
speci c characteristics are a relevant factors for the analysis, which would lead to a
bias if omitted. Moreover, these studies su er from a lack of generality, as very speci c
regulations or industries are analyzed in a single country setting. More recent contri-
butions, that use cross country evidence and time series dimension ( Albrizio, Ko luk,
and Zipperer. (2014)), have found a positive and robust e ect of environmental policy
stringency on productivity growth for the most productive industries and  rms, and
a negative e ect for the  rms lagging behind the global technological frontier. More
technologically-advanced  rms are often the largest, therefore they are more likely to
have the resources to invest in R&D as well as in abatement technologies and scale up
these investments. Given that the distribution of the MNEs is concentrated close to the
frontier, the results of Albrizio, Ko luk, and Zipperer. (2014) provide motivation and
support for the hypothesis tested in this paper.
Empirical literature testing the PHH is based on gravity models or estimates reduced-
form speci cation ( Levinson and Taylor (2004), Cole and Elliott (2003), Ederington,
Levinson, and Minier (2003), among others). Due to lack of data on intra-group trade
at  rm level, most of the contributions consider FDI or imports as dependent variable
and use abatement cost as proxy for EPS.3 Both approaches tend to control for costs that
a ect  rms’ relocation choices on top of the environmental regulation’s burden: labour
and capital costs, transportation costs and tax e ort. Additionally, distance and market
size are often included. Within this set-up, contributions focusing on MNEs  nd mixed
evidence for the PPH. Looking at outbound U.S. investment between 1982 and 1993, Es-
3A common proxy for EPS is the Levinson (2001)’s relative abatement costs measure.
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keland and Harrison (2003) do not  nd robust results supporting the PHH. These results
might be a ected by the small sample size, the poor proxy for stringency used, or, as
the authors point out, the complementarity between capital and abatement: if domestic
abatement lead to energy e ciency gains, the  nal domestic investment cost might be
smaller than the cost of moving production abroad (FDI). Di erently from Eskeland and
Harrison (2003), Millimet and Roy (2011)  nd strong and negative e ects of environ-
mental regulation on FDI, in particular for pollution-intensive industries. The authors
look at 48 contiguous U.S. states from 1977-1994, and consider two FDI measures: the
value of gross property, plant and equipment of foreign-owned a liates and the em-
ployment at foreign-owned a liates. As for GVCs there are no contributions relating
 rms’ economic performance and EPS within a GVC framework of analysis.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Di erently from previous literature, it uses
a cross-country panel and the focus is not restricted to a speci c regulation or channel.
This approach allows us to understand whether internationally integrated  rms have a
comparative advantage in adjusting to tighter environmental regulations. This is a  rst
step in uncovering the trade channel of the productivity e ect of EPS and the  ndings
add scope for future research in this direction. Secondly, this is one of the  rst papers
that employs a cross-countries and time varying index of EPS, which reduce measure-
ment and identi cation concerns with respect to previous contributions.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Firm productivity data
The multi-factor productivity index is constructed using the OECD-ORBIS database4
and following the approach of Wooldridge (2009). Built on Levinsohn and Petrin (2003),
4The OECD-ORBIS dataset has been developed by Gonnard and Ragoussis (2012) on the Bureau Van
Dijk (BvD) ORBIS dataset. This paper is part of an OECD broader project on environmental policy
stringency and economic outcomes, therefore the paper is based on a byproduct of the OECD-ORBIS
dataset generated in July and August 2012. Consolidated national and cross border accounts are
dropped in order to to avoid double-counting. Thus the dataset includes unconsolidated  rm level
data.
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Wooldridge’s production function estimation is a one-step procedure that attempts to
solve the capital measurement issue ( Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006)).5 The panel
includes 11 OECD countries and 22 manufacturing sectors over a ten-year time span
(2000-2009). The countries included are: Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. The sample covers manufac-
turing industries (2-digit, NACE Rev. 1.1, industries from 15 to 37). As usual praxis, the
1st and 99th percentile of the distribution are dropped as they are considered outliers.
Growth rates are log-di erences of two consecutive periods.
3.3.2 Ownership structure
Following Menon (2014) "a business group can be de ned as a set of at least two legally
autonomous  rms whose economic activity is coordinated through some form of hierar-
chical control via equity stakes (Altomonte and Rungi, 2013)". Therefore, international
ownership refers to any situation in which a  rm is controlled, or controls, at least one
foreign  rm by more than a certain participation threshold. Menon (2014) identi es
three thresholds: a "low" one which corresponds to 10 percent of participation shares
or more (MNEs 10), a "medium" one, if the participation is 50 percent or more (MNEs
50) and a "high"one if the participation is 90 percent or more (MNEs 90). The algorithm
used to compute the ownership structure is based on data for the year 2009, thus the
econometric analysis in this paper uses a time invariant de nition of MNEs. This fea-
ture may lead to a measurement error when a  rm is classi ed as multinational based
on 2009 information, while previously it was actually domestic. This said, it is a fair
assumption to consider a time invariant MNEs classi cation for the sample of OECD
countries considered in between 2000 and 2009.
The unbalanced sample consists of 592,778 observations, 394,451  rms with an av-
erage spell of 4.3 years. MNEs are 9% of the sample, 15% are domestic groups and the
rest are standalone domestic  rms. According to the three de nition of MNEs, Table 3.1
shows that, in the sample, there are 33,807 MNEs under the low ownership threshold
and 18,819 under the high one.
5See Gal (2013) for a detailed and comprehensive discussion on the construction of the MFP measures
as well as on the dataset.
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Table 3.1: Sample composition (MNEs and domestic  rms)
N. of  rms N. of observations
MNEs Domestic Share(%) MNEs Domestic Share(%)
MNE 10 33807 353591 9.56 180468 1444074 12.50
MNE 50 24522 362876 6.76 132807 1491735 8.90
MNE 90 18819 368579 5.11 102439 1522103 6.73
3.3.3 Environmental policy stringency and industry
environmental dependence
This paper is based on a new composite index of environmental policy stringency (EPS)
developed by the OECD ( Botta and Ko luk (2014)). The indicator aggregates informa-
tion on national stringency across 15 policy instruments for the energy sector, trans-
port sector and refund schemes (waste). It covers most of the OECD countries over the
period 1990-2012 and it ranges between 0 and 6, where the highest stringency corre-
sponds to the maximum value (6). Despite the fact that the EPS index is built on only
three sectors, it is highly correlated with other available measures of a country’s over-
all environmental policy stringency (CLIMI and WEF index). 6 Therefore, this index
can be seen as a good instrument for overall policy stringency. From an econometric
perspective, using an EPS proxy based on sectors that are not included in the analysis
(such as energy, transport and waste) helps to decrease endogeneity concerns. To check
for reverse causality, an ordered probit on aggregate data is run to test whether MFP
growth can help to forecast future EPS changes ( Mertens and Ravn (2012) and Albrizio
and Lamp (2014)). The indicator variable takes the value one if there is a tightening of
EPS, zero if there is no change and minus one if there is a negative change. Assuming
that the regulator would base policy stringency decisions on the level of the emissions,
on the growth of the economy and on technical change, the additional covariates used
are: lagged economic growth (GDP growth rate), green house gases, shifts in technolog-
6The CLIMI Index (Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index) produced by the EBRD it is a cross-
country index for 2012 which builds on UN country reports and UNFCCC submissions reports. The
World Economic Forum (WEF) measures perceived environmental policy stringency through a survey
of business executives.
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ical frontier capturing the availability of new and more e cient technologies (proxied
by MFP growth of the leader - top performer country by year), as well as a variable to
account speci cally for the innovation e ort in clean technologies (the ratio of green
patents over the total patents application in each country).7 Country  xed e ect are
included, and one to two-lags speci cations are tested. Results lead to reject the hy-
pothesis that past MFP growth can help to explain future EPS changes. On the contrary,
past innovation e orts (green patents), shifts in technological frontier as well as past
levels of GHG are good predictors of future environmental policy tightenings. Annex I
provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used and the results.
As in Albrizio, Ko luk, and Zipperer. (2014), EPS is allowed to a ect MFP growth
di erently according to the environmental dependence (ED) of the individual indus-
try. The underlying assumption is that higher environmental dependence (proxied by
pollution intensity) increases industries’ exposure to a country’s environmental regu-
lation and hence the potential economic e ects of the EPS on that speci c sector are
stronger. To account for this feature, following Rajan and Zingales (1998), the policy
variable (EPS) is interacted with an index of industry pollution intensity. This index
is constructed using US manufacturing sector data in 1987. United States is chosen as
reference country, for two reasons:  rst it can be considered a good proxy for the pre-
sample status quo of technology in the OECD countries included in the analysis;8 and
secondly it reduces endogeneity concerns with respect to a time-varying and country-
speci c sectoral pollution intensity.9
Annex I provides additional details on the methodology used to construct the EPS
7Data Source: OECD Statistics.
8Due to data unavailability at country-level the validity of this proxy cannot be fully veri ed, but at
least the estimate can be seen as a lower bound for the EPS e ect.
9This approach has two shortcomings that have to be kept in mind: the  rst is that using 1987 US values
for all the countries considered could represent a source of measurement error and attenuation bias.
Secondly, the US environmental policies prior to 1987 are likely to be re ected in the structure and
the technology choices of US manufacturing sector generating a bias compared to the other countries
where these policies were not in place. Albrizio, Ko luk, and Zipperer. (2014) test the robustness of
their results using energy intensity instead pollution intensity and the results are unchanged. Energy
dependence is calculated as the share of energy input in production and can be found in the input-
output tables
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and the ED index as well as summarizing charts.
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest across the
four groups identi ed: domestic  rms, MNE 10, MNE 50 and MNE 90. Given the skew-
ness that characterizes these distributions, the median is a more meaningful statistic for
comparison. MNEs are generally bigger and more likely to be technologically advanced,
namely close to the technological frontier. In terms of environmental policy changes,
tightenings are on average the same across groups.
DTF is the distance to technological frontier, where the latter is de ned as the average
MFP of the top 5% of  rms’ MFP distribution by industry across the countries consid-
ered in the sample. EPS change is a three year moving average of the change in the EPS
index (see next section for details).
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics (MNEs)
MFP(g) DTF Employees Turnover(g) EPS change
Domestic  rms
mean 0.00 2.89 25 0.04 0.11
median 0.01 2.53 10 0.02 0.11
sd 0.24 1.40 102 0.26 0.12
min -1.08 0.01 1 -7.84 -0.14
max 0.96 10.24 25266 8.12 0.50
MNEs (10)
mean 0.00 2.66 211 0.03 0.11
median 0.00 2.19 65 0.02 0.11
sd 0.26 1.55 961 0.26 0.11
min -1.08 0.01 1 -7.63 -0.14
max 0.96 9.90 183395 7.57 0.48
MNEs (50)
mean 0.00 2.67 258 0.03 0.11
median 0.01 2.18 82 0.02 0.11
sd 0.26 1.58 1111 0.26 0.11
min -1.08 0.01 1 -7.63 -0.14
max 0.96 9.90 183395 7.56 0.48
MNEs (90)
mean 0.00 2.71 288 0.02 0.11
median 0.01 2.21 91 0.02 0.11
sd 0.26 1.60 1238 0.27 0.11
min -1.08 0.02 1 -7.63 -0.14
max 0.96 9.90 183395 7.56 0.48
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3.4 The Econometric Model
The econometric speci cation is based on a Neo-Schumpeterian model of multi-factor
productivity growth. MFP growth is the results of two forces: the pass-through e ect,
namely the spillovers from the technological frontier, proxied by the industry’s leader
MFP growth, and the catch-up e ect, which consists of the convergence in growth rates
proxied by the distance to the frontier ( Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002); Aghion
and Howitt (2006); BourlÃs, Cette, Lopez, Mairesse, and Nicoletti (2013); Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2003)). This literature shows that regulation may have a heterogeneous ef-
fect on productivity growth depending on the degree of technological advancement
of  rms. Following these previous contributions and Albrizio, Ko luk, and Zipperer.
(2014), environmental policy stringency is interacted with the distance to the industry
global frontier.
International ownership data is used to test whether multinationals experience higher
MFP growth than domestic  rms when facing an EPS tightening. The hypothesis is
tested against the three de nitions of MNEs as de ned by the participation threshold.
The rationale is that frictions in technological spillovers, in production shifting and in
intra-group trade decrease when international ownership linkages are stronger, namely
when  rms’ international participation shares are higher. Therefore, this di erential ef-
fect is captured by interacting the EPS index with dummies that distinguish between do-
mestic (independent and group), if the dummy is zero, and multinationals, if the dummy
equals one, according to the three thresholds (Dm = 1, wherem = 10, 50, 90) .
 lnMFPcijt = ↵1 ln ˜MFPit + ↵2gapcijt-1 + ↵3 ¯EPScit-1
+↵4 ¯EPScit-1gapcijt-1 + ↵5 ¯EPScit-1Dm + ↵6(Taxct -AveTaxjt)Dm
+xcijt + ⌘t +  ci + ✏cijt
m = 10, 50, 90
 ln ˜MFPcijt is the multi-factor productivity growth of  rm j in country c, industry i at
time t. The  rst term of the above equation is the growth of the leader MFP and repre-
sents the technological pass-through.10 The second term is the distance to the frontier,
10The frontier is de ned as the top 5% most productive  rms in each industry and these observations are
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gap= ln( ˜MFPit/MFPcijt), which allows for the technological catch-up e ect.11 The
third term, ¯EPScit-1, is the three-year moving average of the change of the country’s
EPS, from t - 1 to t - 3 and captures the tightening of “industry weighted” environ-
mental policy stringency.12 Following Albrizio, Ko luk, and Zipperer. (2014), changes
of the EPS index (rather than levels) are used for two reasons. From a conceptual point
of view, e ects on productivity growth are likely to be driven by changes in the en-
vironmental policy stringency, while a static level of environmental regulation per se
(seen as a di erence in relative prices of inputs) will not induce changes in the pro-
duction process of  rms. However,  rms will react to new policy implementations by
investing into abatement capital or re-thinking their production processes. Statistical
tests indicate non-stationarity of the EPS index, leading to the use of  rst di erence.13
The fourth term allows for nonlinear e ects of the policy as a function of the tech-
nological gap. The two following interactions capture the additional e ect of EPS on
multinationals (Dm = 1). To enrich the analysis, given recent evidence of pro ts shift-
ing behaviors due to tax evasion ( Ma ni and Mokkas (2010), Johansson, Sorbe, and
Skeie (2014)), the speci cation controls for the di erence between the domestic statu-
tory tax and the average tax that  rm j faces due to its multinational linkages (MNE’s
average group tax). xcit is a vector of additional controls (GDP HP  lter to control for
output gap, R&D expenditures at industry level, demand shocks (past turnover growth,
proxied by log assets),  rm size (log employment), regulatory impact,14 employment
protection (OECD EPL) and current account openness15). Country and industry  xed
not included in the analysis.
11Note that observations of  rms at the frontier are excluded from the analysis.
12As mentioned country’s EPS tightening is interacted with pre-sample industry environmental depen-
dence (ED).
13Notice however that the index is bounded by de nition in between 0 and 6. A speci cation with EPS
level has also been tested but it results not to have a robust and signi cant e ect on industry MFP
growth. The three-year moving average structure accounts for potential delays in policy implemen-
tation as well as for time gap it can take for  rms to react. These may depend on various industry,
country and policy characteristics, hence a moving average approach is likely an appropriate option.
14OECD Indicators of Regulation Impact measures the potential costs of anti-competitive regulation
in selected non-manufacturing sectors on sectors of the economy that use the output of non-
manufacturing sectors as intermediate inputs in the production process.
15Chinn-Ito index measuring a country’s degree of capital account openness. It is based on the binary
dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border  nancial transactions re-
ported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
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e ects control for countries’ institutional di erences, sectoral regulations and charac-
teristics, such as industry speci c transportation costs. Additional robust checks using
country-industry dummies are included and standard errors are clustered at  rm level.
3.5 Results
Table 3.6 reports the results of the main speci cation. Column (1) shows the e ect of
a tightening of EPS without considering international ownership. Column (2) to (4) in-
clude the three de nitions of MNEs (10,50,90) respectively. Country and industry dum-
mies are included. Table 3.7 reports the results of the analysis with country-industry
 xed e ects. All speci cations include the full set of controls, however, results are ro-
bust including  rms and country controls separately.
Insert Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 here
Considering both types of  xed-e ect speci cations, estimates highlight a stronger
e ect of a tightening of EPS for multinationals than for domestic  rms. As an example,
when considering  rms at the frontier, an average change in the EPS equal to 0.1116 is
associated with approximately 1% increase in the rate of MFP growth for domestic  rms
while the same e ect for multinationals (with more than 50 percent of international
participation) is 1.6%. Figure 3.2 reports the marginal e ect of 1 point change in EPS as
function of the DTF (x-axis):
@ lnMFPcijt
@ ¯EPScit-1
= ↵3 + ↵4gapcijt-1 + ↵5Dm
m = 10, 50, 90
The e ect is signi cantly di erent from zero only for  rms within the 50th percentile
to the frontier. Figure 3.3 shows that most of the distribution of the distance to frontier
for MNEs 50 lies on the left side of the corresponding limit for the signi cance of the
e ect (2.45). Actually 65% of MNEs are within this limit.17
As shown in Table 3.6 and 3.7, the e ect is higher and more robust for  rms with
medium and high international ownership (MNEs 50 and 90).18 This evidence suggests
16This is the mean over the previous three years of change in EPS across countries/industries and years.
17An alternative speci cation where the e ect of EPS varies with the DTF also for MNEs has been tested
but results show that this e ect is not signi cantly di erent from the one observed for domestic  rms.
18Additional estimations are run on a two-year moving average MFPg and con rm the results
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Figure 3.2: Marginal e ect of EPS tightening on MFP growth.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of the distance to frontier (MNEs 50).
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a non-linear relationship of EPS and internationalization on productivity: only  rms
with high participation can actually exploit additional opportunities that allow them ei-
ther to reach e ciency gains or to elude the domestic regulation. To investigate further
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this di erence, statistical properties of the main observables for two di erent groups
of multinationals are presented:  rms with medium international participation (> 50%)
and  rms with low linkages (between 10 and 50 percent). Statistics are reported for size,
turnover growth, sectoral composition, EPS tightening exposure,distance to frontier and
country composition over the two groups.
Basic statistics (Table 3.3) and kernel densities (Figure 3.4) suggest that the only observ-
able di erence between the two groups is the size (both number of employees and asset
turnover): MNEss are on average bigger than MNEsw. In terms of the other covariates,
the groups experience the same policy shocks and turnover growth. This evidence is
con rmed by Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and suggests that size, namely capacity and
availability of resources, might allows  rms to capture investment opportunities and
scale-up energy e ciency gains. Considering sectoral composition there are no signi -
cant di erences across the two groups. While looking at country composition, Italy has
an extraordinary high portion of weak MNEs.19
Figure 3.4: Size distribution (MNEs 10-50 versus MNEs >50).
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19As a robustness check Italy is dropped from the sample and the results are unchanged.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics (MNEs 10-50 versus MNEs >50).
Mean Median St.Dev.
MNEs (>50%)
mfpg -0.00958 0 0.25
ldtf 2.65 2.20 1.57
EMPLOYEES 276 91 1020
employ 4.52 4.51 1.43
assetg 0.024 0.021 0.252
EPS change (MA) 0.11 0.10 0.10
MNEs (10-50%)
mfpg -0.01871 -0.00061 0.25
ldtf 2.63 2.22 1.42
EMPLOYEES 91 46 185
employ 3.79 3.82 1.19
assetg 0.038 0.028 0.219
EPS change (MA) 0.11 0.10 0.10
Total
mfpg -0.01184 0 0.25
ldtf 2.65 2.21 1.54
EMPLOYEES 230 76 893
employ 4.34 4.33 1.41
assetg 0.027 0.023 0.245
EPS change (MA) 0.11 0.10 0.10
Main statistics (mean, median, sd) are reported for the variables of interests accordingly
to the two groups of MNEs (between 10 and 50% of international participation and above
50%). The variables reported are: multi-factor productivity growth (mfpg), distance to
frontier (ldtf), EMPLOYEES (number of employees), employ (logarithm of the number of
employees), turnover growth (assetg), three-year moving average of the change in EPS
(EPS change (MA)).
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3.6 Robustness checks and additional hypothesis
International ownership is not the only internationalization option for  rms. This sec-
tion provides further and robust evidence of the e ect found by using two alterna-
tive industry-level measure of internationalization: a measure of participation in global
value chains and the foreign outsourcing index.20
3.6.1 Integration in the global market
Global value chains have radically changed the organization and location of production
processes. Baldwin and Yan (2014) report that in 2003 54% of the world’s manufactured
imports where actually intermediates (OECD data). The increasing fragmentation of
the production into stages of the value chain as well the dispersion across countries
provide  rms with opportunities to elude environmental regulation through o shoring,
or to capitalize on knowledge spillovers and to scale up energy-e ciency investments.
Although MNEs still play an important role within the GVCs ( OECD (2013)), interna-
tional ownership is not a prerequisite and small-medium enterprises play an important
role, in particular, in niche markets. Therefore, the analysis tests whether interacting
the EPS change with a dummy for high GVC participation, as an alternative measures
for internationalization, con rm the productivity e ect of EPS tightening found us-
ing international ownership share. To identify which sectors have higher international
decentralization of the intermediate stages of the production and consequent trade in
intermediates, the index of foreign value added embodied in domestic  nal demand as a
percentage of GDP (total value added) is ranked across sectors. This ratio is part of the
OECD-WTO Trade in value added database (TiVa 2013) and provides information on
how industries abroad (upstream in a value-chain) are connected to domestic demand
and this ratio can most readily be interpreted as ’imports of value-added’ (OECD-WTO
TiVa 2013). Data are available for the following years: 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008 and 2009.
Due to potential bias caused by the recent crisis, only the sectoral shares for 2005 are av-
eraged across countries by industry.21 This allows to divide the industry sample into two
groups: industry with imports in domestic value-added which are more/less than the
20Table 3.5 in the Appendix reports the correlations across the main variables of interest.
21The groups would not change considering the mean over three years (1995, 2000, 2005), as the thresh-
olds are practically the same, see Table 3.4.
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50th percentile of the industry share distribution across countries (which corresponds
to less than 1% of GDP). The "high GVC" group includes manufacturing of chemical,
rubber, plastics and fuel products (2325), other non-metallic mineral products (2600),
basic metals and fabricated metal products (2728), machinery and equipment (2933),
transport equipment (3435); while the "low GVC" industries are textiles and footwear
(1719), wood (2000), pulp, paper and printing (2122) and manufacturing n.e.c. and re-
cycling (3637).22 The former groups is expected to be able to experience relative cost
advantages, and consequently higher productivity, due to higher o shoring possibilities
from the GVC structure.
Table 3.8 reports the results of the main speci cation with the additional interaction
between EPS changes and the dummy for industry with high foreign upstream partici-
pation. Column (1) does not include international ownership, while columns (2)-(7) add
the MNEs dummies. The average positive e ect of a tightening in EPS is still present
and robust. Additionally the EPS e ect in sectors with high share of foreign upstream
participation in the production process is associated with higher MFP growth indepen-
dently from the international ownership structure.
Insert Table 3.8 here
As a robustness check on the group de nition, alternative GVC participation indexes
has been considered. Sectors have been grouped according to two indexes from the
OECD Global Value Chain database: the index of the number of international produc-
tion stages and the participation index. According to the GVC dataset, the  rst indicator
"measures the length of production processes when the intermediate inputs for the re-
alization of a  nal product or service are sourced from foreign countries", while the
second one, "as proposed by Koopman, Powers, Wang, and Wei (2010), is expressed as
the share of foreign inputs (backward participation) and domestically produced inputs
used in third countries’ exports (forward participation) in a country’s gross exports".
The rationale is similar to the previous exercise: if a sector has a higher number of
stages performed internationally or a high participation in GVCs, it may have addi-
tional opportunities of cost reduction compared to less globally integrated productions.
22TiVa has a di erent sector categorization than NACE 2, thus ad hoc adjustments have been made to
match the two databases.
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Moreover, a  rm participating in GVCs may learn from foreign markets both directly,
through buyer-seller relationships (learning by importing or exporting), and indirectly,
through increased competition from foreign producers ( Loecker (2010) and Gu and
Baldwin (2005) among many others). Table 3.4 shows that the 50th percentile for each
of the variables considered to build up the groups. Based on this criteria (median across
countries by sector) the resulting groups’ composition is invariant.
Table 3.4: GVC indexes.
Variable Obs Percentile Centile
Foreign VA in domestic  nal demand (% of GDP) in 2005 297 50 0.96
Number of international production stages in 2005 297 50 0.59
Participation in 2005 297 50 2.34
Foreign VA in domestic  nal demand (% of GDP) - average 297 50 1.12
Number of international production stages -average 297 50 0.61
Participation - average 297 50 2.47
Finally, the same speci cation is tested by grouping industries according to the for-
eign intermediates outsourcing index (OECD). This industry index captures the inten-
sity in intermediates use and it is constructed as the share of imported intermediates
in the total intermediates expenditure. A high value of the index implies higher  exi-
bility in o shoring intermediates production. Therefore, an EPS tightening is expected
to have an additional positive e ect on industries with high foreign intermediates out-
sourcing index: manufacturing of chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products (2325),
other non-metallic mineral products (2600), basic metals and fabricated metal products
(2728), wood (2000), pulp, paper and printing (2122). As Table 3.9 shows, the aver-
age positive e ect is no longer signi cant. However, the positive additional e ect of
EPS on MFP growth for international  rms is con rmed also under this weaker de ni-
tion of international linkages, which does not necessarily involve GVC or international
ownership. This result proves even stronger the relevance of the trade channel for the
productivity e ect of EPS.
Insert Table 3.9 here
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3.6.2 Additional hypothesis of EPS tightening intensity
This section presents the results of the analysis for di erent intensities of EPS tighten-
ing. The distribution of EPS changes is skewed to the right (Figure 3.5). Considering
changes above the 85th percentile still covers 13% of the changes in the sample. Thus
in the analysis only EPS changes over the 85th percentile are interacted with the MNEs
dummy.23
Figure 3.5: EPS tightening distribution.
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Insert Table 3.10 here
Table 3.10 shows that high changes in EPS have a positive and strongly signi cant
e ect for all three of the de nitions on MNEs, di erently from Table 3.6 and 3.7, where
the full range of EPS changes is considered and the e ect on MNEs 10 was only slightly
signi cant. Di erent explanations for this result may apply. On the one hand, MNEs
10 may increasingly take advantage of their international channel when EPS tighten-
ing considerably raises the cost of polluting. On the other hand, it could be that high
EPS tightening triggers (costly) investment in abatement which may lead to signi cant
23Di erent thresholds have been tested: below the 85th percentile the e ect is not robust.
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technology uptake and to substantial energy e ciency gains due to the complementar-
ity between capital and abatement ( Eskeland and Harrison (2003)).24 However, further
investigation is needed to under the channels grounding these results.
3.7 Conclusion
In light of the ongoing environmental policy tightening across OECD countries, this
paper studies whether  rms’ economic performance may depend on their international
ownership structure. Multinationals (MNEs) may adjust to an increase in Environmen-
tal Policy Stringency (EPS) through the following main channels: o shoring part of
their production to a liates in countries with lax environmental policy, exploiting intra-
group technology transfers and scaling-up investments in energy-e ciency. MNEs may
consequently experience higher productivity growth than domestic  rms that are, in-
stead, not able to exploit such international channels when facing an EPS tightening.
Using a panel of 11 OECD countries and 22 sectors over the period 2000-2009, the anal-
ysis  nds that the estimated e ect of a change in EPS for the most productive multi-
national  rms is 60 percent higher than for domestic  rms. This positive e ect is con-
 rmed using two alternative measures to approximate the degree of integration in the
global market at industry level: participation in global value chains and outsourcing of
production of intermediates abroad. Additional evidence shows that larger changes in
EPS are associated with higher boosts in MNEs productivity growth, suggesting possi-
ble non-linearity of the e ect of EPS on productivity.
24As pointed out by Eskeland and Harrison (2003), neglecting the possible complementarity between
capital and abatement may lead to biased estimates of the e ect of EPS on o shoring decisions of
 rms. Eskeland and Harrison (2003) model shows, in fact, that such complementarity may decrease
the opportunity cost of outsourcing production to foreign a liates. If investments in domestic abate-
ment also lead to substantial energy e ciency gains, the  nal adjustment cost (investment cost in
equipment net of e ciency gains) may end up being smaller than the cost of moving part of the pro-
duction abroad. Thus, when the EPS tightening is coupled with substantial energy e ciency gains,
 rms will invest domestically and will not o shore.
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3.7.1 Annex I
Ordered probit: data and results
Data included in the probit model are: country multi-factor productivity index (Johans-
son et al. (2013)) from which the MFP growth of the leader is calculated as the country
with the highest MFP in each year; the ratio of green patents over the total patents
application under PCT in each country (OECD); the GHG emission level is expressed in
billions of tons of CO2 equivalent (OECD).
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDPg 457 2.323 2.709 -8.538 10.730
GHGtot 462 0.621 1.355 0.011 7.22
MFPg Leader 439 0.005 0.015 -0.016 0.033
patents 255 0.07 0.013 0.056 0.101
MFPg 428 0.003 0.034 -0.192 0.125
Indicator variable: EPS tightening
L.GDPg L2.GDPg L.GHGtot L2.GHGtot L.MFPg Leader L2.MFPg Leader
  0.161 0.258 2.944 14.70*** -17.22 -46.43**
SE (0.162) (0.154) (4.943) (3.851) (12.51) (17.45)
L.patents L2.patents L.MFPg L2.MFPg year N
  -135.7 628.0*** -12.81 -11.01 -1.010*** 200
SE (72.71) (133.6) (10.61) (10.57) (0.168)
Environmental policy stringency
Measures of environmental policies often lack a cross-country and/or time dimension
(Dasgupta et al. (1995), CLIMI index (Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index)
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produced by the EBRD, the perceived environmental policy stringency by the World
Economic Forum (WEF)). As mentioned, empirical analysis are often base on estimated
cost of abatement in order to proxy for stringency. The EPS composite index, used in
this paper, summarizes an aggregate environmental policy stringency of selected instru-
ments in a tree-structure (Figure 3.6). The  rst two branches are market-based instru-
ments, which assign an explicit price to the externalities, versus non-market based ones
(taxonomy developed by De Serres et al. (2010)). The  rst sub-component includes:
taxes (CO2, SOX, NOX, and diesel fuel), trading schemes (CO2), renewable energy cer-
ti cates, energy e ciency certi cates, feed-in-tari s and deposit-refund-schemes. The
non-market component consists of standards (emission limit values for NOX, SOX, and
PM, and limits on sulphur content in diesel), and technology-support policies, such as
government R&D subsidies.
Figure 3.6: Structure of the EPS index.
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Industry environmental dependence
Pollution intensity data come from the IPPS Pollution Intensity and Abatement Cost
World Bank dataset, which consists of data for US manufacturing sector in 1987. Indus-
tries are ranked based on pollution intensity (relative to value added) on seven pollutant
categories (two water pollutants, four air pollutants and one toxic substance). The “en-
vironmental dependence” is then the simple average of these seven scores, and it can
take values from zero (least polluting industry) to 1 (most polluting industry). Figure
3.4 reports the ED index by sectors.
Figure 3.7: Industry Environmental Dependence.
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Table 3.5: Correlation among the main variable of interest.
EPS DTF MNEs 10 MNEs 50 MNEs 90 Out GVC
EPS 1
DTF 0.8393 1
MNEs 10 0.2465 0.1515 1
MNEs 50 0.2125 0.1269 0.8661 1
MNEs 90 0.1827 0.109 0.7547 0.8717 1
Out 0.9418 0.8323 0.215 0.1865 0.158 1
GVC 0.6208 0.677 0.2307 0.2086 0.1818 0.7186 1
The variables in the Table refer to the interactions with the 3-year moving average change
in EPS.
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Table 3.6: International ownership and EPS tightening
(country and industry dummies).
Dependent variable:
MFP growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
  / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)
Leader MFP growth 0.041* 0.043** 0.043** 0.043**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
DTF (lag) 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
EPS tightening (3y ma) 0.096** 0.090* 0.090* 0.091*
(0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048)
DTF*EPS tightening –0.035** –0.034** –0.034** –0.034**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Cycle (lag) 0.667 0.666 0.660 0.661
(0.616) (0.621) (0.621) (0.621)
Crisis 2008 –0.086*** –0.086*** –0.086*** –0.086***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Employment (ln)(lag) 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Turnover growth (lag) 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital account openness (lag) –0.802 –0.735 –0.797 –0.821
(3.342) (3.386) (3.383) (3.384)
Employment protection (lag) –0.252*** –0.252*** –0.252*** –0.249***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Regulatory Impact (lag) –0.209 –0.203 –0.205 –0.206
(0.292) (0.295) (0.295) (0.295)
Time trend 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
MNEs 10 (dummy) 0.005
(0.003)
MNEs 10*EPS tightening 0.035*
(0.020)
tax di  (MNE 10) –0.032
(0.046)
MNEs 50 (dummy) 0.002
(0.004)
MNEs 50*EPS tightening 0.051**
(0.024)
tax di  (MNEs 50) –0.030
(0.048)
MNEs 90 (dummy) 0.001
(0.004)
MNEs 90*EPS tightening 0.057**
(0.026)
Tax di  (MNEs 90) –0.034
(0.054)
Observations 511897 505274 505274 505274
R2 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.064
Country and Industry dummies Y Y Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.7: International ownership and EPS tightening
(country-industry  xed e ect).
Dependent variable:
MFP growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
  / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)
Leader MFP growth 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
DTF (lag) 0.146*** 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.148***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
EPS tightening (3y ma) 0.119** 0.114** 0.113** 0.114**
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
DTF*EPS tightening –0.052*** –0.051*** –0.051*** –0.051***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Cycle (lag) 0.682 0.701 0.697 0.694
(0.632) (0.639) (0.639) (0.639)
Crisis 2008 –0.088*** –0.088*** –0.088*** –0.088***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Employment (ln) (lag) 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Turnover growth (lag) 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital account openness (lag) 0.680 1.010 0.974 0.935
(4.255) (4.317) (4.314) (4.313)
Employment protection (lag) –0.297*** –0.298*** –0.299*** –0.296***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Regulatory Impact (lag) –0.724 –0.764 –0.774 –0.777
(0.788) (0.787) (0.786) (0.786)
Time Trend –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
MNEs 10 (dummy) 0.012***
(0.003)
MNEs 10*EPS tightening 0.027
(0.020)
tax di  (MNE 10) 0.020
(0.045)
MNEs 50 (dummy) 0.008**
(0.004)
MNEs 50*EPS tightening 0.040*
(0.024)
tax di  (MNEs 50) 0.022
(0.046)
MNEs 90 (dummy) 0.005
(0.004)
MNEs 90*EPS tightening 0.048*
(0.025)
Tax di  (MNEs 90) 0.005
(0.052)
Observations 511897 505274 505274 505274
R2 0.090 0.091 0.091 0.091
Country-Industry FE Y Y Y Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.8: GVC participation and high EPS tightening
(country-industry  xed e ect).
Dependent variable:
MFP growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
  / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)
Leader MFP growth 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
DTF (lag) 0.149*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.150***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
EPS tightening (3y ma) 0.096** 0.096** 0.096** 0.096**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
DTF*EPS tightening –0.074*** –0.074*** –0.074*** –0.075***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Cycle (lag) 0.778 0.811 0.808 0.806
(0.624) (0.631) (0.631) (0.631)
Crisis 2008 –0.089*** –0.089*** –0.089*** –0.089***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Employment (ln) (lag) 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Turnover growth (lag) 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital account openness (lag) 0.030*** 1.298 1.263 1.233
(0.009) (4.353) (4.350) (4.349)
Employment protection (lag) –0.346*** –0.345*** –0.345*** –0.345***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Regulatory Impact (lag) –0.576 –0.656 –0.655 –0.656
(0.750) (0.754) (0.754) (0.753)
High GVC participation (dummy) 1.920 –0.097*** –0.097*** –0.098***
(10.460) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
High GVC*EPS tightening 0.155*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Time trend –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
tax di  (MNE 10) 0.026
(0.045)
MNEs 10 (dummy) 0.014***
(0.002)
tax di  (MNEs 50) 0.032
(0.045)
MNEs 50 (dummy) 0.012***
(0.002)
Tax di  (MNEs 90) 0.019
(0.052)
MNEs 90 (dummy) 0.011***
(0.002)
Observations 511897 505274 505274 505274
R2 0.091 0.092 0.092 0.092
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.9: Foreign intermediates outsourcing index and
EPS tightening (country-industry FE).
Dependent variable:
MFP growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
  / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)
Leader MFP growth 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
DTF (lag) 0.147*** 0.150*** 0.149*** 0.149***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
EPS tightening (3y ma) 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
DTF*EPS tightening –0.061*** –0.061*** –0.061*** –0.061***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Cycle (lag) 0.689 0.724 0.721 0.719
(0.619) (0.626) (0.626) (0.626)
Crisis 2008 –0.089*** –0.089*** –0.089*** –0.089***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Employment (ln) (lag) 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Turnover growth (lag) 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital account openness (lag) 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Employment protection (lag) –0.316*** –0.316*** –0.316*** –0.316***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Regulatory Impact (lag) –0.905 –0.984 –0.984 –0.984
(0.767) (0.767) (0.767) (0.767)
High outsourcing (dummy) 2.063 3.166 3.080 3.004
(10.330) (10.489) (10.482) (10.479)
High Out*EPS tightening 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Time trend –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
tax di  (MNE 10) 0.026
(0.045)
MNEs 10 (dummy) 0.015***
(0.002)
tax di  (MNEs 50) 0.032
(0.046)
MNEs 50 (dummy) 0.012***
(0.002)
Tax di  (MNEs 90) 0.019
(0.052)
MNEs 90 (dummy) 0.011***
(0.002)
Observations 511897 505274 505274 505274
R2 0.091 0.092 0.092 0.092
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.10: MNEs and high EPS tightening (country-
industry FE).
Dependent variable:
MFP growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
  / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)   / (SE)
Leader MFP growth 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.067***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
DTF (lag) 0.146*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.148***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
EPS tightening (3y ma) 0.120** 0.120** 0.120** 0.120**
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
DTF*EPS tightening –0.052*** –0.052*** –0.052*** –0.052***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
High EPS 0.003
(0.038)
Cycle (lag) 0.680 0.714 0.714 0.712
(0.635) (0.639) (0.639) (0.639)
Crisis 2008 –0.088*** –0.088*** –0.088*** –0.088***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Employment (ln) (lag) 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Turnover growth (lag) 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital account openness (lag) 0.592 0.744 0.724 0.778
(4.758) (4.333) (4.323) (4.317)
Employment protection (lag) –0.297*** –0.296*** –0.296*** –0.296***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Regulatory Impact (lag) –0.710 –0.740 –0.741 –0.754
(0.866) (0.784) (0.784) (0.785)
Time Trend –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
MNEs 10 (dummy) 0.013***
(0.002)
MNEs 10*High EPS tightening 0.186***
(0.058)
tax di  (MNE 10) 0.029
(0.045)
MNEs 50 (dummy) 0.011***
(0.002)
MNEs 50*High EPS tightening 0.238***
(0.067)
tax di  (MNEs 50) 0.036
(0.045)
MNEs 90 (dummy) 0.009***
(0.002)
MNEs 90*EPS tightening 0.245***
(0.062)
Tax di  (MNEs 90) 0.022
(0.051)
Observations 511897 505274 505274 505274
R2 0.090 0.091 0.091 0.091
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.112
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